# 1NC

## Off

### 1nc k

#### Movements against neoliberalism are growing in Latin America and spill over -- the plans reifies neoliberalism --- ethics require we de-link to preserve the environment and indigenous culture.

Harris 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­ nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

#### Environment collapse causes extinction – tipping points are coming

**Foster et al., Oregon sociology professor, 2010**

(John, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, pg 14-8, ldg)

It is common today to see this ecological rift simply in terms of climate change, which given the dangers it poses and the intractable problems for capitalism it presents has grabbed all the headlines. But recently scientists—in a project led by Johan Rockstrom at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, and including Crutzen and the leading U.S. climatologist, James Hansen—have developed an analysis of nine "planetary boundaries" that are crucial to maintaining an earth-system environment in which humanity can exist safely. Climate change is only one of these, and the others are ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, the nitrogen and the phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, change in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. For the last two, atmospheric aerosol loading and chemical pollution, there are not yet adequate physical measures, but for the other seven processes clear boundaries have been designated. Three of the boundaries—those for climate change, ocean acidification, and stratospheric ozone depletion—can be regarded as tipping points, which at a certain level lead to vast qualitative changes in the earth system that would threaten to destabilize the planet, causing it to depart from the "boundaries for a healthy planet." The boundaries for the other four processes—the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, freshwater use, change in land use, and biodiversity loss—are better viewed as signifying the onset of irreversible environmental degradation. Three processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries: climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss. Each of these can therefore be seen, in our terminology, as constituting an extreme "rift" in the planetary system. Stratospheric ozone depletion was an emerging rift in the 1990s, but is now stabilizing, even subsiding. Ocean acidification, the phosphorus cycle, global freshwater use, and land system change are all rapidly emerging global rifts, though not yet extreme. Our knowledge of these rifts can be refined, and more plan-etary rifts may perhaps be discovered in the future. Nevertheless, the analysis of planetary boundaries and rifts, as they present themselves today, helps us understand the full scale of the ecological crisis now confronting humanity. The simple point is that the planet is being assaulted on many fronts as the result of human-generated changes in the global environment.4 In the planetary boundaries model developed by Rockstrom and his associates, each ecological process has a preindustrial value (that is, the level reached before the advent of industrial capitalism), a pro-posed boundary, and a current status. In the case of climate change the preindustrial value was 280 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere; its proposed boundary is 350 ppm (necessary if tipping points such as a catastrophic rise in sea level are to be avoided); and its current status is 390 ppm. Biodiversity loss is measured by the rate of extinction (number of species lost per million species per year). The preindustrial annual rate, referred to as the "natural" or "background" rate of species loss, was 0.1-1 per million; the proposed boundary is 10 per million; whereas the current rate is greater than 100 per million (100-1,000 times the preindustrial back-ground rate). With respect to the nitrogen cycle, the boundary is con-cerned with the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere for human use in millions of tons per year. Before the rise of industrial capitalism (more specifically before the discovery of the Haber-Bosch process early in the twentieth century), the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere was 0 tons. The proposed boundary, to avoid irreversible degradation of the earth system, is 35 million tons per year. The current status is 121 million tons per year. In each of these extreme rifts, the stability of the earth system as we know it is being endangered. We are at red alert status. If business as usual continues, the world is headed within the next few decades for major tipping points along with irreversible environmental degradation, threatening much of humanity. Biodiversity loss at current and projected rates could result in the loss of upward of a third of all living species this century. The pumping of more and more nitrogen into the biosphere is resulting in the creation of dead zones in lakes and ocean regions (a phenomenon also affected by phosphorus). Each one of these rifts by itself constitutes a global ecological crisis. These ruptures reveal that the limits of the earth system are not determined by the sheer physical scale of the economy but by the particular rifts in natural processes that are generated.5 The emerging rifts in the other ecological processes, which have not yet overshot their boundaries, are scarcely less threatening. For the phosphorus cycle (categorized as part of a single planetary boundary together with the nitrogen cycle), the preindustrial quantity flowing into the oceans per year was approximately 1 million tons; the proposed boundary is 11 million tons (based on the assumption that ocean anoxic events begin at ten times the background rate); and its current status is already 8.5 to 9.5 million tons. In regard to ocean acidification, the value refers to a global mean saturation state of arag-onite (a form of calcium carbonate) in surface seawater. A decline in the number indicates an increase in the acidity of the ocean. The preindustrial value was 3.44 (surface ocean aragonite saturation state); the proposed boundary—after which there would be a massive die-down of shell-forming organisms—is 2.75; and the current status is 2.90. In the case of freshwater use, the preindustrial annual consumption of freshwater in km3 (cubic kilometers) was 415; the estimated boundary is 4,000 km3 (marking a threshold beyond which the irreversible degradation and collapse of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems is likely); and the current rate of consumption is 2,600 km3. For change in land use, the parameters are set by the percentage of global ice-free land surface converted to cropland. In preindustrial times, this percentage was very low. The proposed boundary is 15 percent (after which there is the danger of triggering catastrophic effects on ecosystems), and the current status is 11.7 percent. In each of these emerging rifts, we are faced with an orange alert status, in which we are rapidly moving toward extreme conditions, whereby we will pass the planetary boundaries, undermining the earth system that supports the conditions of life. No measure for chemical pollution has yet been determined, but proposals include measuring the effects of persistent organic pollu-tants (otherwise known as POPs), plastics, endocrine disrupters, heavy metals, and nuclear waste on ecosystems and the earth system in general. Likewise, no measure has yet been determined for atmospheric aerosol loading (the overall particulate concentration in the atmosphere on a regional basis), which can disrupt monsoon systems, lead to health problems, and interact with climate change and freshwater boundaries. Stratospheric ozone depletion is the one previously emerging rift that was brought under control (as far as anthropogenic drivers were concerned) in the 1990s, reducing what was a rapidly growing threat to life on the planet due to an increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun. The preindustrial value of ozone concentration was 290 (Dobson Units—the measurement of atmospheric ozone columnar density, where 1 Dobson Unit is defined as 0.01 millimeters thick under standard pressure and temperature); the proposed planetary boundary is a concentration of 276 (after which life on the planet would experience devastating losses); and the current status is 283. Between 60°S and 60°N latitude, the decline in stratospheric ozone concentrations has been halted. Nevertheless, it will take decades for the Antarctic ozone hole to disappear, and Arctic ozone loss will likely persist for decades. Life on the planet had a close call.6 The mapping out of planetary boundaries in this way gives us a better sense of the real threat to the earth system. Although in recent years the environmental threat has come to be seen by many as simply a question of climate change, protecting the planet requires that we attend to all of these planetary boundaries, and others not yet determined. The essential problem is the unavoidable fact that an expanding economic system is placing additional burdens on a fixed earth system to the point of planetary overload. It has been estimated that in the early 1960s humanity used half of the planet's biocapacity in a year. Today this has risen to an overshoot of 30 percent beyond the earth's regenerative capacity. Business-as-usual projections point to a state in which the ecological footprint of humanity will be equivalent to the regenerative capacity of two planets by the mid-2030s.7 Rockstrom and his associates concluded their article in Nature by stating: "The evidence so far suggests that, as along as the [planetary boundary] thresholds are not crossed, humanity has the freedom to pursue long-term social and economic development." Although this is undoubtedly true, what is obviously not addressed in this conclu-sion—but is clearly the point of their whole analysis—is that these thresholds have in some cases already been crossed and in other cases will soon be crossed with the continuation of business as usual. Moreover, this can be attributed in each and every case to a primary cause: the current pattern of global socioeconomic development, that is, the capitalist mode of production and its expansionary tendencies. The whole problem can be called "the global ecological rift," referring to the overall break in the human relation to nature arising from an alienated system of capital accumulation without end.'

#### Vote Neg to reject the Aff’s neoliberal economic engagement in favor of a commons-based approach. That solves and creates space to challenge neoliberalism

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2003**

(Massimo, “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”, Winter, <http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of “alternatives” to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to “join” our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves ‘from movement to society’. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node “knows” of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets’ understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today’s new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new political discourse is based on the project of defending and extending the space of commons, at the same time building and strengthening communities through the social fields.

### 1nc da

#### Obama has sufficient PC to make and pass a deal on Iran now – but new agenda items overstretch focus and PC and trigger cascading prolif and war with Iran

Sabet 9-13 (Farzan Sabet, co-founder and editing manager of IranPolitik.com, doctoral student in International History and M.A. International History & Politics, Graduate Institute, Geneva, focused on international relations, international trade law, and Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy, “4: Iran: Resolving the Nuclear Crisis,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, September 2013, p.74-77, http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2013/JPIA-2013-Final.pdf)

American President Barack Obama currently has an unprecedented opportunity to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. In¶ the first year of his second term, he has substantial political capital at home and a strong coalition of countries supporting his sanctions strategy and nuclear negotiations abroad. Just as¶ importantly, devastating economic sanctions since 2012 may¶ have increased the willingness of the Islamic Republic of Iran to¶ compromise¶ on its nuclear program. This policy paper argues¶ that President Obama should capitalize on this historic window¶ of opportunity by acknowledging Iran’s right to a peaceful¶ nuclear program and offering a roadmap for lifting sanctions in¶ exchange for deep concessions by Iran on its nuclear program.¶ The United States has not yet placed substantive sanctions relief on the table, and this may be the key to breaking the¶ deadlock in P5+1-Iran nuclear negotiations. However, the¶ current strong U.S. negotiating position will erode over time¶ and thus President Obama must take decisive action to resolve¶ the Iranian nuclear crisis.¶ INTRODUCTION¶ As President Barack Obama resettles into the White House and as pres¶ -¶ ident-elect Hassan Rouhani prepares to take on his new office, a historic¶ window of opportunity may exist for the United States of America and¶ the Islamic Republic of Iran to not only resolve the crisis over the contro¶ -¶ versial Iranian nuclear program but to also seek broader rapprochement.¶ There are, however, many obstacles in the path of successful negotiations.¶ Both sides will be under pressure from hardline domestic actors seeking¶ a continuation of the status quo. The United States will also be under¶ strong pressure from important allies abroad, including Israel and the Gulf¶ Cooperation Council (GCC), to extract maximum concessions from Iran.¶ The Islamic Republic, for its part, wants to project an image of strength¶ to foreign audiences and can only accept a deal which, at the very least,¶ allows it to save face (Mousavian 2013). This creates constraints on the¶ both sides, limiting the range of possible agreements.¶ Failure to reach a negotiated settlement, however, could have potentially¶ catastrophic consequences for American interests. At one extreme, this¶ failure may allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability, shifting the¶ balance of power in the Middle East and beginning a nuclear proliferation cascade. The Obama administration, however, has ruled out a situation in¶ which the United States is forced to contain a nuclear weapon-latent Iran.¶ At the other extreme, the United States may have to carry out military operations on Iranian nuclear facilities, an option which could temporar¶ -¶ ily set back the Iranian nuclear program but would likely have disastrous¶ humanitarian consequences and lead to a regional conflagration. An attack¶ could also give Iran a justification to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation¶ Treaty (NPT) and make a dash for nuclear weapons, undermining the¶ cause of nuclear non-proliferation. The Iranian nuclear crisis is thus one¶ of the most important international security issues today.¶ Since the failure of the first round of negotiations between the Obama¶ administration and the Islamic Republic in October 2009, the United¶ States has pursued a “comprehensivizing” and “multilateralizing” economic¶ sanctions strategy. This means that the United States has expanded the¶ scope of sanctions to broader swaths of the Iranian economy, particularly¶ its financial and petroleum sector, and multiplied the number of actors¶ complying with sanctions. Since the five permanent members of the¶ United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) and the Islamic¶ Republic resumed high level political negotiations in February 2013, a¶ question has hung in the air: Has the Obama administration’s sanctions¶ strategy sufficiently changed Iran’s cost-benefit analysis to make a nuclear¶ deal more likely?¶ This policy paper argues that this is the case. More specifically, it argues ¶ that by applying sanctions to Iran the United States has increased the costs of¶ failing to reach an agreement for Tehran. Sanctions appear to have strongly¶ contributed to the rapid deterioration of the Iranian economy since at least¶ 2012. What this means for Iran is that the price of continuing its nuclear¶ program on the current trajectory is no longer diplomatic condemnation¶ or vague threats of military action but deteriorating social conditions and¶ severe economic pain that it can measure in the billions of dollars. While¶ sanctions have largely succeeded as a mechanism of economic pain, this¶ paper argues that expectations of what sanctions can achieve should be¶ tempered and that pain must be applied in a broader framework that¶ also includes incentives. As such, while sanctions have made a negotiated¶ settlement of the nuclear crisis more likely, they cannot be relied upon to¶ achieve a breakthrough by themselves. Negotiations must ultimately offer¶ acknowledgement of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program under the¶ NPT and a viable road map for lifting sanctions if they are to succeed.¶ While President Obama’s re-election, Rouhani’s election, and the¶ relative success of sanctions thus far provide a window of opportunity for¶ a mutually beneficial negotiated settlement of the nuclear crisis, several¶ factors may erode the current strong U.S. position over time. First, as¶ time passes, other policy priorities will divide the Obama administration’s attention and political capital, weakening its ability to sell a negotiated settlement at home. Second, the Islamic Republic is already mitigating¶ some of the effects of sanctions through a variety of methods, decreasing¶ sanctions’ value as a bargaining chip for the United States. Finally, the¶ P5+1 and sanctions coalitions may begin to unravel over a wide range of¶ issues, such as the attractiveness of Iranian petroleum resources at steep¶ discounts or the humanitarian impact of sanctions, reducing the impact¶ of sanctions and the international momentum for a negotiated settlement.¶ Time is thus of the essence.¶ Based on these observations this paper proposes four specific policy¶ recommendations for the U.S. strategy toward P5+1-Iran nuclear negotia¶ -¶ tions, taking into account both domestic, foreign, and temporal factors.¶ First, President Obama should end the dual-track strategy as it is currently¶ conceived. This means halting the expansion of the Iran sanctions regime¶ by the U.S. Congress while negotiations are ongoing, as this may encourage Iran to escalate its nuclear program to maintain the balance of power¶ in negotiations. Second, President Obama can offer to help suspend E.U.¶ and some U.S. sanctions in exchange for suspensions of elements of the¶ Iranian nuclear program. This suspension-for-suspension proposal creates¶ further trust and builds momentum. Third, President Obama should use ¶ this momentum to reach a final agreement. A final resolution of the nuclear¶ crisis will require the Obama administration to offer both acknowledge¶ -¶ ment of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program and a viable road map¶ for sanctions relief. Fourth, the Obama administration must put in place¶ guarantees that make any final agreement lasting. This paper makes its¶ case in three parts. Part one briefly reviews the historical background of¶ the Iranian nuclear crisis. Part two argues that current conditions could¶ allow for a mutually acceptable deal, but that this window of opportunity¶ will not last forever. Part three lays out the four policy proposals in detail.

#### War with Iran causes extinction

Hirsch 5 (Jorge, Professor of Physics, University of California, San Diego, Ph.D., University of Chicago, “Can a Nuclear Strike on Iran Be Averted”, 11-21-2005, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8089>)

Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it. In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "human wave" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam stopped them with chemical weapons, the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons. In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over.

### 1nc t

#### *Interpretation* – federal economic engagement means only *direct aid* and *trade agreements* – the AFF causes *third-party* engagement

Daga 13 (Sergio Daga, director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, Bolivia, visiting senior policy analyst, Heritage Foundation, M.A. Economics, University of Chile, B.A. Economics, Catholic University of Bolivia, also trained at Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile, and the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, United States, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela,” National Center for Policy Analysis, Debate Backgrounder No. 7, 5-15-2013, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economics is the branch of human knowledge concerned with the ¶ satisfaction of human wants through the production of goods and ¶ services, and the exchange of those goods and services between two ¶ or more individuals. Thus, economics encompasses human activities ¶ from simple barter between two individuals to international trade ¶ between firms or governments. Many of these economic activities ¶ are regulated by government, and some are outlawed. Trade and ¶ other economic activities that cross national borders — such as ¶ sales of goods and services, travel, migration or transfers of money ¶ — are regulated by both the government of the originating country ¶ and the government of the destination country. The government ¶ itself could be an economic actor, buying and selling from other ¶ governments or firms in other countries; or the government could ¶ regulate the private economic activities of individuals and firms.¶ Economic engagement between or among countries can take ¶ many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements ¶ designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign ¶ aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic ¶ engagement with private economic engagement through 3) ¶ international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) ¶ remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are ¶ important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate ¶ resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by ¶ the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with ¶ respect to some countries than to others.

#### *Prefer it* –

#### First, *limits* – any regulation, product, or private action is justified – infinite unpredictable AFFs

#### Second, *ground* – means-focus is key to stable disad and counterplan prep – they create a race to shallow, unpredictable single-sector strategies

### 1nc cp

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order to establish normal trade relations with the Republic of Cuba.

#### An executive order can remove embargo provisions

ASCE 09 (Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, “Lifting the Cuban Embargo: The New Labors of Hercules?”, Cuba in Transition, 2009, <http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/traviesodiaz.pdf>)

The actions taken by the United States in the past to remove trade embargoes against foreign countries appear to show that, unless such lifting is specifically limited by the legislation, Presidential decisions and determinations are sufficient authority to lift trade embargoes. On that basis, removing the TWEA as a source of the Cuban trade embargo would be straightforward. The simplest procedure would be for the President to abstain from issuing the required annual Determination that exercise of the TWEA authority with respect to Cuba is in the national interest of the United States. An alternative, but perhaps more controversial, course of action would be for the President to issue an executive order expressly ending the state of emergency with regard to Cuba. The same document could repeal[s] other elements of the embargo, such as some of the CACR issued after March 1996. Alternatively, the Treasury Department could take administrative action to rescind the post-1996 CACR.64 In the case of the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(a)(1) of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1), authorizes the President to “establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.” This section is clearly permissive and leaves the President free to determine whether to “maintain” the embargo, and consequently whether to lift it. The President could remove the embargo, to the extent it is imposed under this provision, by an executive order that rescinds President Kennedy’s Proclamation and revokes all subsequent executive orders and regulations thereunder implementing aspects of the embargo. The President could also take this action unilaterally, without reference to any external events.

#### Obama cred is *low* because of failure to make *unilateral* engagement decisions – acting unilaterally re-establishes credibility

Luxner 13 (Larry Luxner, citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on matters of National Security and Foreign Policy, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Senior Research Professor of International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Counselor, Trustee and Co-Chair of the Advisory Board, Center for Strategic and International Studies, member of the International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council, “Brzezinski: Obama Must ‘Regain’ Lost Ground in Foreign Policy,” Washington Diplomat, 1-31-2013, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=8841&Itemid=414)

Two days after the election that returned President Barack Obama to the White House for a second term, one of America's best-known former diplomats offered his take on the world — and the audience found his observations just as relevant as they were three decades ago.¶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, didn't mince words when it came to Obama. "He has to undo the excessive reliance on speeches as he acts on the world scene — that is to say, the apparent assumption that a powerful speech on this or that subject is the same as effecting change," Brzezinski said. "The speeches all promised a great deal, but a great deal did not transpire. There was some marginal progress here and there, but by and large, his speeches remain speeches."¶ The Polish-American diplomat, 84, gave his own speech Nov. 8 at the Aspen Institute's Ambassadors' Security Roundtable luncheon at the Four Seasons hotel; moderating the discussion was CNN's Washington-based foreign affairs correspondent Jill Dougherty. In attendance were some 75 guests, including ambassadors representing a range of countries from Afghanistan to Zambia, as well as lobbyists, consultants and various State Department officials.¶ The event was part of the recent launch of the Ambassadors' Security Roundtable, a quarterly convening of ambassadors from around the world to promote greater international cooperation in the critical realm of security. The luncheon followed an off-the-record gathering of European envoys at the Aspen Institute's Wye River campus on Maryland's Eastern Shore in October.¶ Brzezinski, whom Dougherty introduced as a "living legend," said that in 2008, "at a lunch of this sort," he spoke of how impressed he was with the president-elect's "knowledge and understanding of the basic dynamics of this era."¶ Four years later, Brzezinski argued that Obama must reassert his credibility on the world stage through serious commitment and decisive action that will shape both his legacy and the country's trajectory.¶ "The management of our foreign policy and the protection of our national security are interwoven, and the president has no peer," Brzezinski said. "Congress is not a partner in the shaping of foreign policy. That is the special domain of the president, and he has to regain that territory."¶ It's territory Brzezinski has traversed for decades. During his time as Carter's national security advisor, Brzezinski oversaw the normalization of U.S. relations with China, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the rise of mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan, the growth of dissent in Soviet-influenced Eastern Europe, the signing of a treaty to relinquish U.S. control over the Panama Canal, and the brokering of the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.¶ The chairman of countless commissions, task forces and councils, Brzezinski has been in the foreign policy trenches since the 1960s. The elder statesman remains active today, teaching at universities such as Harvard, Columbia and Johns Hopkins and writing numerous widely regarded books, including his most recent: "Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power."¶ In the 2012 book, Brzezinski argues that U.S. policymakers need to rethink the country's place in an interdependent world where America is no longer the sole superpower — adapting to shifting geopolitics while reasserting American influence in order to preserve global stability.¶ "Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism. Such an America could cause the geopolitical prospects of an evolving world — in which the center of gravity is shifting from West to East — to become increasingly grave," he writes. "The world needs an America that is economically vital, socially appealing, responsibly powerful, strategically deliberate, internationally respected, and historically enlightened in its global engagement with the new East."

#### *Turns the case* – means US influence *backfires* – and triggers *economic instability* AND multiple scenarios for *global conflict*

SCMP 2K (South China Morning Post, “Position of Weakness” December 11, 2000, Lexis Nexis)

A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.

## Case

### 1nc ag

#### US is modeling Cuba now

Viljoen and Bohn 12 (André , an architect and principal lecturer in architecture at the University of Brighton, and Katrin, an architect and joined the faculty in September 2001 where she teaches architecture at the University of Brighton“Scarcity and Abundance: Urban Agriculture in Cuba and the US”, 7 JUL 2012, Wiley)

Ten years on from our ﬁrst observations in Cuba, the country’s organopónicos remain, and elsewhere, not least in the US, urban agriculture experiments are testing out different scenarios. Baltimore, Milwaukee and Chicago are among a vanguard of North American cities actively encouraging urban agriculture. Recent discussions with planners and activists in the US conﬁrm the observation that practice is outstripping policy, as individuals take forward urban agriculture projects at a range of scales and with diverse aims. At the time of writing, one could say (if we grossly simplify the situation) that in Europe wider urban strategies, broadly in line with the CPUL city concept, are being developed, while in the US a complete spectrum of pioneering individual projects are underway aiming to encompass and interlock desires for social gain, empowerment, community building, environmental improvement and commercial viability. The range of new projects is staggering, and if Cuba’s urban agriculture revealed spatial possibilities and the effectiveness of systematic support systems, the US is testing different spatial, technical and ﬁ nancial models of production. In New York, for example, alongside a long-established radical and thriving community garden movement, new rooftop farms are appearing. Predominantly established by media-savvy young graduates and activists, these are pioneering projects whose participants – through sheer hard work – are prototyping new, commercially viable food-producing or educational enterprises. Across the US, hydroponics and soil-based cultivation are being utilised for rooftop and covered (glasshouse) cultivation with much work occurring in Milwaukee, led by Will Allen’s organisation Growing Power. Many new organisations, like Sweetwater Organics, prototyping large-scale urban aquaponic systems, can be traced back to Growing Power.

#### Ag production high now – solves the advantage

Taylor 12 (Timothy Taylor, Distinguished Lecturer by the Department of Economics at the University of Minnesota, Managing Editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, a quarterly academic journal produced at Macalester College and published by the American Economic Association, “Can Agricultural Productivity Keep Growing?”, CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST, October 19, 2012, <http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2012/10/can-agricultural-productivity-keep.html>)

As the world population continues to climb toward a projected population of 9 billion or so by mid-century, can agricultural productivity keep up? Keith Fuglie and Sun Ling Wang offer some thoughts in "New Evidence Points to Robust But Uneven Productivity Growth in Global Agriculture," which appears in the September issue of Amber Waves, published by the Economic Research Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.¶ Food prices have been rising for the last decade or so. Fuglie and Wang offer a figure that offers some perspective. The population data is from the U.N, showing the rise in world population from about 1.7 billion in 1900 to almost 7 billion in 2010. The food price data is a a weighted average of 18 crop and livestock prices, where the prices are weighted by the share of agricultural trade for each product. Despite the sharp rise in demand for agricultural products from population growth and higher incomes, the rise in productivity of the farming sector has been sufficient so that the price of farm products fell by 1% per year from 1900 to 2010 (as shown by the dashed line).¶ What are some main factors likely to affect productivity growth in world agriculture in the years ahead? Here are some of the reactions I took away from the paper. ¶ Many places around the world are far behind the frontier of agricultural productivity, and thus continue to have considerable room for catch-up growth. "Southeast Asia, China, and Latin America are now approaching the land and labor productivity levels achieved by today's industrialized nations in the 1960s."¶ The rate of output growth in agriculture hasn't changed much, but the sources of that output growth have been changing from a higher use of inputs (machinery, irrigation, fertilizer) and toward a higher rate of productivity growth. "Global agricultural output growth has remained remarkably consistent over the past five decades--2.7 percent per year in the 1960s and between 2.1 and 2.5 percent average annual growth in each decade that followed. ... Between 1961 and 2009, about 60 percent of the tripling in global agricultural output was due to increases in input use, implying that improvements in TFP accounted for the other 40 percent. TFP's share of output growth, however, grew over time, and by the most recent decade (2001-09), TFP accounted for three-fourths of the growth in global agricultural production."

#### Lifting the embargo means agribusiness crowds out Cuban ag – destroys the model and turns the advantage

Gonzalez 3 **-** Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law (Carmen, “SEASONS OF RESISTANCE: SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN CUBA” 16 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 685, Summer, lexis)

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.n411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. n412 Due to U.S. [\*730] pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.n413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). n414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba's economic isolation may only be a matter of time. n415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban [\*731] sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba's gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries. n417 Furthermore, Cuba's experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers - as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century. n418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads - as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba's future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government's implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.n419 The [\*732] distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state's food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba's experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba's alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba's alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Cuban model fails – it doesn’t solve food production or the environment

Avery 9 **-** Dennis T. Avery, is a senior fellow with the Hudson Institute in Washington. Dennis is the Director for Global Food Issues cgfi.org. He was formerly a senior analyst for the Department of State (“Cubans Starve on Diet of Lies” Canadian Free Press, 3/23, <http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/9571>)

The Cubans told the world they had heroically learned to feed themselves without fuel or farm chemicals after their Soviet subsidies collapsed in the early 1990s. They bragged about their “peasant cooperatives,” their biopesticides and organic fertilizers. They heralded their earthworm culture and the predator wasps they unleashed on destructive caterpillars. They boasted about the heroic ox teams they had trained to replace tractors.¶ Organic activists swooned all over the world.¶ Now, a senior Ministry of Agriculture official has admitted in the Cuban press that 84 percent of Cuba’s current food consumption is imported, according to our agricultural attaché in Havana. The organic success was all a lie—a great, gaudy, Communist-style Big Lie of the type that dictators behind the Iron Curtain routinely used throughout the Cold War to hornswoggle the Free World.¶ This time the victims of the Big Lie are the Greens in the organic movement who want us to trust our future food supplies to their low-yield “natural farming” The Greens want us to outlaw nitrogen fertilizer, biotechnology and whatever else might save room for the planet’s wildlife through higher farm productivity.¶ But now the Cubans have admitted sneaking rice, wheat, corn and soy oil imports into the country, bought with tourist dollars from European and Canadian visitors—many of whom came to see Cuba’s “stunningly successful” farming-of-the-future. As the U.S. embargos have loosened, food imports from the U.S. are also increasing.¶ The Cuban farming deception was aided by the “useful idiots” in the non-Communist world. The late Donnella Meadows, who wrote the stunningly-foolish book Limits to Growth in 1972, gushed over Cuban farming: “Suddenly deprived of half its food and most of its agricultural inputs, [Cuba] has not only maintained but increased its food supply in a way that creates jobs and improves the environment.”¶ Right, by importing 84 percent of the food.¶ Cuba has lots of unused farmland, but Castro’s system discouraged rural farmers. They couldn’t get their over-quota surplus to the cities for lack of fuel and trucks. Much of Cuba’s rural land has now grown up to thorny marabou bushes.¶ Instead, more than 10,000 Cuban city dwellers have become full-time gardeners. Environmentalist Bill McKibbon wrote in Harpers of an few-acre urban garden in Havana, on a site intended for a hospital. It grows 25 different vegetables, employing 64 people. Most of the beans and carrots have to be delivered to the government for the “ration stores” but the gardeners can make their own deals with the neighbors for the rest. The gardeners only make about 150 pesos per month. Still, there’s even less to buy in Cuba than in the old Soviet Union—including almost no meat and little milk. They mainly subsist on rice and beans.¶ Should America force its people to spend their days’ hand-weeding vegetables in a field that should have been a hospital? Should our food be rationed like Cuba’s? Instead, 3 percent of Americans grow the food, on far less expensive land.¶ As Blake Hurst concluded in his March, 23 Weekly Standard article, “Dirt Poor in the Workers’ Paradise:” “If you are going to have a sustainable agricultural paradise, it helps to have a nearby neighbor with a million or so industrial farmers.”

#### No impact to food scarcity

Kennedy, 08 – Project Manager within the Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD) (Jonathon, “Don't Panic! The Long-Term Is Up and To The Right”, 29 APRIL 2008, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/don-t-panic-2008-4)

As the economy sputters into Q2, apocalyptic economic and environmental prophesies are splattered across the major newspapers. But as Canada’s [National Post explains](http://www.nationalpost.com/opinion/story.html?id=472602&p=1), there’s no reason to panic. Disaster has been forecast since time immemorial, and it never seems to happen. To the contrary, since the Industrial Revolution, the average quality of life across the globe has continued to rise by almost every meaningful measure.¶ Disaster scenarios are easy to fall for because almost any short-term crisis can be made to look forboding by extrapolating short-term trends indefinitely into the future:¶ The trouble with doom-and-gloom predictions — whether they be about oil shortages, food scarcity, water wars or population explosions –is that most are based on the linear extrapolation of short-term trends. If, say, rice prices rise, alarmists assume they will keep rising indefinitely at the same rate — and then produce scary-looking graphs that show trend lines veering up into the wild-eyed blue yonder.¶ But history shows that human adaptation invariably intervenes –especially in parts of the world that have the benefit of a market economy. Scarcity drives innovations that pull the world back from the brink. Consumers take high prices as their cue to consume less; producers take the same cue to produce more. A new equilibrium is reached, just as college microeconomics textbooks would predict.¶ When [Thomas Malthus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malthusian#Influence) made his dire predictions about a population explosion he wasn’t wrong. His mistake was in assuming that societal and technological dynamics wouldn’t change over time. Malthus could never have imagined birth control pills or genetically modified food.¶ And just as Malthus didn’t imagine the kinds of technologies that would solve his disaster scenario, it’s similarly hard to imagine the kinds of technology that will mitigate reosource scarcity and climate change. This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t take these problems seriously, or that we shouldn’t be willing to make sacrifices to tackle them. What it does mean is that we shouldn’t panic.

#### No internal link – your evidence indicates we already know everything about the cuban model – we haven’t adopted it yet and lifting the embargo won’t change that

### 1nc leadership

#### Plan is NOT *necessary* – Obama’s pragmatic multilat solves their *impact*

Kupchan 12 (Charles A. Kupchan, professor of international affairs, Georgetown University, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; and Bruce W. Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science, Duke University; “The Democrat View: Obama’s Strong Suit,” The World Today, Oct/Nov 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/The%20World%20Today/2012/october/WT1012Kupchan.pdf)

When it comes to handling matters of¶ America’s national security, Republicans¶ have for decades commanded much more¶ public confidence than Democrats. Not¶ any longer. President Barack Obama has¶ effectively cornered the market on foreign¶ and defence policy, leaving Team¶ Romney on the defensive, struggling to¶ land punches on Obama’s record.¶ In his acceptance speech at the Republican¶ Convention in August, Mitt Romney¶ devoted scant time to foreign policy,¶ effectively an admission that national security¶ is not the Republicans’ strong suit.¶ When they do try to score points against¶ Obama, Republicans say that his leadership¶ has been weak and vacillating. They¶ claim that instead of celebrating America’s¶ exceptional history and superior strength,¶ Obama apologises for US hegemony and¶ is too accommodating of challenges to¶ US power.¶ Republicans mistake prudence for weakness.¶ Obama’s statecraft may lack the hard¶ edges and black-and-white absolutes of his¶ predecessor’s, but the abandonment of¶ ideological excess in favour of principled¶ pragmatism is, perhaps, the greatest asset¶ of Obama’s diplomacy. Washington is¶ again embracing a brand of leadership¶ based on engagement and persuasion¶ rather than coercion and bravado. In this¶ vein, Obama’s readiness to talk to adversaries¶ is not, as Republicans would have it,¶ naïve appeasement; it is savvy diplomacy¶ aimed at taming longstanding rivalries.¶ Obama’s formula for exercising American¶ leadership rests on striking a balance¶ between power and partnership geared¶ to the dynamic nature of this 21st century¶ world. The Bush administration relied¶ too heavily on power and bluster alone –¶ a mistake that Romney seems all too¶ prepared to repeat – failing to understand¶ that brute force and intimidation often do¶ more to invite resistance than acquiescence.¶ Instead, Obama has adhered to¶ a centrist brand of US internationalism¶ that provides leadership through teamwork¶ and consensus building, relying on¶ coercion only as a last resort.¶ Obama’s embrace of multilateralism has¶ shored up America’s alliances around the¶ globe. Allies again feel like partners that¶ matter, not objects of American power.¶ Opinion surveys reveal that in many countries,¶ people hold much more positive¶ views of the United States today than they¶ did during the Bush era. Meanwhile,¶ Washington has repaired its tarnished¶ relationship with international institutions,¶ including the UN and NATO. All¶ told, one of Obama’s signature accomplishments¶ is the reclamation, at home and¶ abroad, of the legitimacy of American¶ power and purpose.¶ While emphasizing the value of partnership,¶ Obama has by no means dismissed¶ the need for power; he is anything but gun¶ shy, as made clear by the killing of Osama¶ bin Laden and Washington’s regular use of¶ drone strikes against terrorist targets.¶ Indeed, when it comes to countering the¶ terrorist threat, Obama’s resort to ‘smart¶ power’ has proved far more effective and¶ much less costly than George W. Bush’s¶ ‘global war on terrorism’.¶ At the same time, Obama understands¶ the limits of US power. He withdrew from¶ Iraq on schedule, and is in the midst of¶ handing over to Afghans responsibility for¶ managing their country. The primary¶ objective of the US military – the effective¶ elimination of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan –¶ has been achieved. The Afghan government¶ and its security forces are admittedly¶ not yet as developed as they should be, and¶ the Taliban have proved more resilient¶ than expected. But without more capable¶ and co-operative partners in both Afghanistan¶ and Pakistan, it makes little sense¶ for the United States and its coalition partners¶ to extend the military mission. Delaying¶ the American withdrawal, as Romney¶ has indicated he would do, is to divorce¶ strategy from realities on the ground.¶ As to Obama’s readiness to engage¶ adversaries, Washington’s outreach is neither¶ appeasement nor an apology for¶ American hegemony; it is good diplomacy.¶ Relations between Moscow and Washington¶ have been more diffcult of late, in no¶ small part due to Russian President¶ Vladimir Putin’s alignment with the Syrian¶ government and his crackdown on the¶ political opposition at home. But the ‘reset’¶ between Russia and the United States has¶ yielded significant progress on a number of¶ important issues, including nuclear arms¶ control, Afghanistan, and diplomacy with¶ Iran. Patient engagement with Myanmar¶ has paid off; diplomatic and commercial¶ contacts have deepened in step with¶ political liberalization.¶ Engagement, of course, does not always¶ produce quick results. Obama’s outreach¶ to Tehran has yet to be reciprocated.¶ In response, Obama has imposed ever-tighter¶ sanctions and taken other steps to¶ disrupt Iran’s nuclear programme. A diplomatic¶ breakthrough is still possible, but¶ if Tehran continues its intransigence, Obama¶ holds in reserve the option of a military¶ strike. Meanwhile, US offcials have been¶ consulting and co-ordinating with Israel.¶ Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Arab¶ Spring continues to follow an unpredictable¶ and uncertain path, with risks as well as¶ opportunities. Obama is right to pursue a¶ strategy that differentiates among the¶ unique circumstances in each country¶ experiencing political change. He is also¶ appropriately standing behind the forces¶ of democracy and pluralism, avoiding blanket¶ opposition to Islamist political forces¶ and working with new Islamist governments¶ when interests are shared.¶ The turmoil in the Arab world has for¶ now diverted attention away from the¶ Israel-Palestine front. After scant progress¶ during the first half of his term, Obama¶ backed off deep engagement in the peace¶ process. But amid distrust between Israelis¶ and Palestinians, Washington will have to¶ facilitate dialogue if a two-state solution is¶ to have any chance of realization.¶ Even amid ongoing challenges in the¶ Middle East, Obama has begun to rebalance¶ US priorities, of which the pivot¶ to Asia is a key component. The United¶ States is deepening its commercial and¶ strategic presence in the region. With¶ China, Washington is seeking to deepen¶ trust and co-operate on shared interests¶ while at the same time firmly deterring the¶ Chinese from resorting to intimidating or¶ aggressive behaviour.¶ Obama has admittedly fallen short on¶ some fronts. Economic recovery at home¶ and abroad has been elusive. Partly¶ due to the sluggish economic conditions,¶ he has made little headway in liberalizing¶ international trade. He came into offce¶ pledging to close Guantánamo and to take¶ determined steps to address global warming;¶ neither has happened. On these and¶ other issues, Obama has run up against¶ powerful constraints at home and abroad.¶ But the continuing diffusion of global¶ power, fiscal austerity, and the debilitating¶ polarization of American politics only¶ make more impressive the many accomplishments¶ of the Obama presidency.¶ The American public is aware of Obama’s steady stewardship of US statecraft.¶ That is one of the reasons he has a very¶ good chance of being re-elected in November,¶ affording him four more years to build¶ on the achievements of his first term.

#### US unilateral action is inevitable – ideology – committing to multilateralism in one instance doesn’t solve

**Bass 9** (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, “Unilateral vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach to Guiding America’s Future Foreign Policy,” Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 3-6, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)

According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, **America’s preference for unilateral engagement is explained by three inherent characteristics.** **First, a sense of “exceptionalism” that evolved from America’s founding principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.**5 As a champion for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and security. Nevertheless, **American exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect its values, and avoid any engagement that might infringe upon its sovereignty**.6 In fact, America’s preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for unilateralism throughout the 1900’s.7 Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism. Specifically, after World War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that would counter the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy was dictated by the executive branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements where it served national security.8 **Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution produced a separation of powers that limits the government’s ability to endorse multilateral commitments**. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. **This construct makes it possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement.**9 For example, during World War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilson’s support.10 **Third, America’s current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is based on rules and norms rather than power.** As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.11 For example, a given UN convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention. Here **it is helpful to note specific instances in which the three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US action on foreign policy issues**. To begin with, **the US has used military force without United Nations (UN) approval**. While the US did attain UN approval for coalition intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, America’s frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it to act without UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo. **These interventions set a precedent for the future unilateral use of force**.12 Indeed, **the US demonstrated its most dramatic disregard for international institutions in March of 2003** when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an ultimatum despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN proposal for use of force in February of 2003. America’s praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.13 However, the “Bush Doctrine” and America’s failed efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in international opposition to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.14 At the same time, the US has increasingly restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 In addition to declining peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning financial support during the 1990s.16 **The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on global security issues.** Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999 the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.17 Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national missile defense (NMD) system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002 after failing to secure Russia’s cooperation.18 Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence of a compliance scheme, international efforts to implement verification procedures were rejected by the Bush administration in 2001on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.19 **US lack of interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends beyond WMD threats**. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the convention has been signed by 156 countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea strategy.20 Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush administration’s insistence on curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other changes that weakened the draft convention.21 The US has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights, technology transfers, antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.22 Nevertheless, the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has declined to ratify the International Criminal Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, it engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.23 **The US has also been reluctant to embrace conventions that address world-wide issues such as global warming**, evidenced by the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001.

#### *Multilat fails* – AND prevents a shift to *minilat* – flips their impacts

Gvosdev 12 (Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, Senior Editor at the National Interest, former Senior Fellow of Strategic Studies at the Nixon Center, Rhodes Scholar, Ph.D., St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” World Politics Review, 6-15-2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral)

Speaking at the Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum this week, Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group and author of the recently published “Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World,” argued that we are living through a period of “creative destruction” of the post-World War II global architecture. The problem, however, is that no single state currently possess the necessary preponderance of resources to be able to construct a new global system, as the U.S. was able to do in the aftermath of World War II. ¶ This is not to argue that the United States has entered into a period of irreversible decline. Indeed, the other major power centers that are often presented as future peer competitors are experiencing their own shocks, from the eurozone crisis to economic stagnation in Japan to the protests rocking Russia to the formidable challenges that Xi Jinping and the “fifth generation” of leadership in China will have to confront. As a result, the United States is benefiting from the perception that it, like the dollar, remains a “safe haven.” But though the U.S. is still a superpower, its current fiscal and economic problems leave it in no position to finance a new global system or impose common standards on the nations of the world, the way it did in the postwar period by rebuilding Western Europe and East Asia and creating the institutional foundations that paved the way for globalization. ¶ As for the possibility that the “international community” might play the collective role of system-enabler, Bremmer is pessimistic, as am I. He anticipates no significant outcomes from the upcoming G-20 summit, for instance, because there is simply no consensus among the participating states on how to cope with any of the problems topping the global agenda. No state, not even the United States, can impose its will on the rest, while all the major powers can exercise effective vetoes to torpedo action. The United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized the no-fly zone over Libya last year, once considered a possible model of great power cooperation, looks more and more like an outlier.¶ Bremmer says that this gives Washington a choice: It can persist in trying to work through an increasingly dysfunctional global architecture, or it can focus on reasserting U.S. leadership, but at a regional level or among “coalitions of the willing.” In this way, rather than struggling to find compromises in order to set up global arrangements, whether on trade, climate or human security, Washington would focus time and effort on developing workable structures between like-minded states. In some areas, such as trade issues, this is already happening. As Daniel Wu and Marc Mealy recently noted, “With stuttering progress in the WTO Doha Round, the proliferation of bilateral and regional preferential trade liberalization efforts seems to suggest that it’s easier for small groups of states that share common goals and values to make progress than it is for 200 sovereign states in the world to find common ground.” ¶ The Obama administration came into office with high hopes that it could resuscitate a truly global consensus on key issues that the Bush administration’s preferences for unilateral action had damaged. It believed that diplomatic engagement rather than a “my way or the highway” approach would produce results. The reality has been disappointing, and not just from Washington’s perspective: International polling data collected by Gallup earlier this year show that the image of U.S. leadership is under increasing strain in the third year of Barack Obama's presidency, with approval waning “even among some of the biggest fans of the country's leadership” now that the initial euphoria over Obama's election has worn off. ¶ Focusing efforts on a smaller group of countries more predisposed to share the U.S. view of things might be a better approach to enhancing American leadership. This does not mean writing off efforts to diplomatically engage other major powers, such as China, or to try to find points of commonality with them for global action. But it recognizes that there will be times when trying to find a common position will be futile -- and that sometimes seeking one will lead to the U.S. being blocked from taking the types of action it might prefer. Syria may end up being one such test case.¶ At the same time, the United States can work on developing institutions more limited in scope. By surrendering the pretense to aspire to universality, Washington could then exclude from these initiatives those countries that otherwise would have the power to block action. Taking a page from the European Union’s efforts to engage with Russia, which involved establishing a series of “common spaces,” the United States could work with a set of countries in Europe, West Africa, Latin America and East Asia to create a series of common spaces among like-minded nations that promote free movement of people, goods and ideas, and which provide the basis for security cooperation. Both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area are moves in this direction.¶ Critics would argue that such a proposal is an abrogation of U.S. global leadership: By focusing on a smaller group of states, the United States would in essence be writing off the rest to fall under the “hegemony” of other rising and resurgent powers like China or Russia. Others might be concerned about whether or not institutions that did not include major powers might fail in the same way that the League of Nations failed in the period between the two world wars.¶ But the real test for global leadership in the 21st century will be which country sets the standards that become commonly accepted as the rules of the road. The West won the last expression of this kind of competition, with Western standards going global after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rise of the rest has now challenged those assumptions, so the United States needs to go back to the drawing board. In terms of trade in the Asia-Pacific region, what will end up being more attractive to most of the states of the region: a Chinese-led process of integration or the U.S.-backed TPP? Would countries such as Brazil or India prefer to build their own institutions with China and Russia or become partners with the United States in constructing common spaces? And if they decline, what about what Dan Twining has called the other “set of ascending powers,” countries such as Mexico or Indonesia, which may be more open to forming these common spaces with Washington?¶ Though we may be returning to an era of competition, it need not be characterized by hostility; there is no reason, as Wu and Mealy put it, why different institutions cannot “coexist but engage in friendly rivalry.” The U.S. experience in institution-building, and in offering its partners alliances on easy terms, gives it some major advantages over its erstwhile rivals in such a global environment. There is no reason why it shouldn’t take advantage of them.

#### Liberal institutions prove the US isn’t key to multilateralism

Ikenberry 11 (G. John, “A World of Our Making: The international order that America created will endure—if we make the transition to a grand strategy based on reciprocity and shared leadership.” G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies. Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea. In 2013-2014 Ikenberry will be the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, Oxford. <http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=2>)

Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.

#### Multilateralism fails – organizations fail and exclusion of countries is inevitable – the US is not key

Gallagher 10 (leading Australian consultant on trade and public policy (Peter, “Plurilateralism… get used to it,” 12/20/10, [http://www.petergallagher.com.au/index.php/site/article/plurilateralism...-get-used-to-it)](http://www.petergallagher.com.au/index.php/site/article/plurilateralism...-get-used-to-it)//AY)

Those Orga­ni­za­tions will go on. So will mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism. This week is only another reminder that col­lab­o­ra­tive man­age­ment of the global com­mons (peace, trade… pos­si­bly emis­sions) is, and always has been, very dif­fi­cult to achieve. The ‘one-world, one vision’ approach endorsed by the U.N. in its cur­rent form and backed for sixty years by the U.S. and Europe (chiefly) may be too hard to sus­tain for the next lit­tle while. Dur­ing the past decade, the veil of mul­ti­lat­eral col­lab­o­ra­tion thrown over the inner-workings of the U.N./Bretton-Woods man­age­ment frame­work has grown thin­ner and thin­ner. **There has always been a cer­tain amount of stiff-arming** behind the veil. But, with appro­pri­ate restraint—including by Japan—it worked for a long time to deliver effec­tive global col­lab­o­ra­tion. After this week, it will never be quite the same. But there’s no need for panic. It’s a shame but no emer­gency that a U.N. meet­ing turns out to be another expen­sive dud. Just relax and try to enjoy the ride. Enjoy the rich­ness of greater global diver­sity, for one thing. The extra­or­di­nary thing about this week in Copen­hagen is not what we didn’t see (an agree­ment on emis­sions) but what we *did* see, clearly for the first time. The veil of mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism has fallen long enough to show the world the present real­i­ties behind it. First, of course, the expen­sive, chaotic sham of 192 nations in at least as many lim­ou­sines, from Tuvalu to the United States, try­ing to agree on 1 text with at least 2 tar­gets lubri­cated by a $100billion bribe (that turned out to be only a $10billion i.o.u.) Sec­ond, and more impor­tant, The Pres­i­dent of the United States being intro­duced to a meet­ing to which he not been invited—*at which he did not even have a seat*—to nego­ti­ate a nar­row deal, sav­ing the appear­ance of col­lab­o­ra­tion, with Brazil, China, India and South Africa. To enter the room, Obama had to leave Europe and Japan out in the cold. He had to work out a deal with four giant economies that col­lec­tively hold quite a few mark­ers on the future of the global com­mons, but most of whom are by any mea­sure still poor coun­tries. The [account](http://bit.ly/8172r2) of this meet­ing is a vision of the global frame­work for col­lab­o­ra­tion now and in the next few decades. What we now have as a frame­work for global orga­ni­za­tion is a roil­ing, argu­men­ta­tive, pluri­lat­er­al­ism where alliances and coali­tions slip and slide along a dozen dif­fer­ent planes of inter­na­tional endeav­our. Farewell to the old two-handed back-room brawls and staged con­sen­sus of the *pax atlantica*. In the new frame­work broad, top-down ‘solu­tions’ like Kyoto’s tar­gets and the WTO’s ‘Sin­gle Under­tak­ing’ cannnot be made to work by a fly­ing visit from the U.S. Pres­i­dent or alter­nate hand-wringing and blus­ter from Brussels. The bad news—if you’d like the world to be a set­tled place ruled by, say, a benef­i­cent dic­ta­tor (oxy­moron) from Wash­ing­ton or even Beijing—is that ‘global gov­er­nance’ now becomes a tricky mat­ter of rec­on­cil­ing and align­ing many dif­fer­ent, prob­a­bly autonomous, or at best regional attempts to deal with the man­age­ment of global com­mons. **Guar­an­teed to be messy.**

### 1nc relations

#### No solvency for relations---Cuba doesn’t want it and doesn’t believe we’ll follow through

Anya Landau French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, 2/10/13, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba?,” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.¶ Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

#### Multiple alt causes prevent sustainable relations

**Llana 2011** [Sara Miller, “A year of drift in US-Latin American relations”, Dec 23, 2011, Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1223/A-year-of-drift-in-US-Latin-American-relations//cc>]

\*human rights

\*immigration

\*drugs

\*china

In March, US President Barack Obama took his first trip to Latin America, stopping off in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. In October, the US approved long-awaited free trade deals with Panama and Colombia. According to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll, carried out across 18 countries in the region, President Obama ranked as the most popular leader in the Americas.

This year should have been a stellar one for US-Latin America relations, a major step forward after years of setback. But instead, despite the many positive developments, the relationship is characterized by, if not disdain, then definite distance.

“I think it’s a curious moment,” says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. “There is no evidence of great acrimony in US-Latin American relations as there was four or five years ago. But at the same time, there is this sense of distancing and drift, especially between the US and South America.”

The greatest symbol of that is the regional body that was officially launched in December, called the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which includes 33 countries across the Americas but specifically excludes the US and Canada.

Many members of the body are strong allies of the US, but long-time foes such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have said they hope it counters the other major regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington.

Such old-time arguments still flare. President Chavez, for example, has been weakened at home, as the country’s opposition strengthens ahead of 2012 presidential elections. In theory, that is good for the US, and the rhetoric between the two has been low-key this year. But it just flared again, with Obama sharply criticizing the state of human rights in Venezuela and the country’s relationship with Iran.

“We're concerned about the government's actions, which have restricted the universal rights of the Venezuelan people, threatened basic democratic values, and failed to contribute to the security in the region," Obama wrote in response to questions posed by the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.

He added that he believes Venezuela’s relationship with Iran has not served the interest of Venezuelans. “Ultimately, it is up to the Venezuelan people to determine what they gain from a relationship with a country that violates universal human rights and is isolated from much of the world,” President Obama said. “Here in the Americas, we take Iranian activities, including in Venezuela, very seriously and we will continue to monitor them closely.”

Chavez countered on state television: "Obama, take care of your own business, focus on governing your country, which you've turned into a disaster. Leave us alone.”

Venezuela’s relationship with Iran is among the most contentious foreign policies issues within the US-Latin American dynamic but other relationships rankle too. The Cuban government, for example, decreed three days of mourning this week in the wake of the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. They joined Venezuela and Nicaragua in expressing condolences.

But in general, the positive has outweighed the negative this year. Perhaps the US’s strongest ally in the region right now is Mexico, where its strategy against organized crime, despite questionable success, is vociferously supported in Washington. The US continues to underline its support.

The trade deal signed with Panama and Colombia strengthens US economic ties to both countries. And the US has restored relations with the economic powerhouse in the region – Brazil. (Trouble had started to brew over former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s relationship with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.)

Still, on balance, the US is no closer to Latin America than it’s been since 9/11, when attention shifted to terrorism and away from the issues most Latin Americans care about, especially immigration. The region’s favorable view of the US has grown, from 58 percent in 2008 to 72 percent in 2011 (down slightly from a high of 74 percent in 2009), according to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll. The slight dip can be explained by a boost in expectations for Obama after former US President George W. Bush left office – he was widely reviled in Latin America. But even under Obama issues like immigration and drugs have been stuck. There is little hope of them getting “unstuck” in the upcoming US election year.

More than anything, however, is the simple fact that the US is no longer the sole player for Latin America. Obama's March trip was billed by the media as an effort to recapture US influence in Latin America. But Latin America has moved on. Countries are looking amongst themselves and much farther, particularly to China, to bolster their economies. They are forming their own relationships with countries, whether the US likes it or not. Of course US foreign policy matters here, but it matters so much less than it used to.

“There is just a sense that Latin America is pursuing its own agenda,” says Mr. Shifter.

#### Removing the embargo does not guarantee relations with Cuba – turns democracy

National Review, 09 – (Editors of the National Review, “Embrace Trade, Not Chávez”, National Review Online, APRIL 21, 2009, [http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227336/print)//SP](http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227336/print)/SP)

This past weekend’s Summit of the Americas, in Trinidad and Tobago, was a carnival of platitudes and absurdities. As a “gift,” Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez gave Pres. Barack Obama a radical-left history book written by Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano. Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega delivered a buffoonish anti-U.S. rant that lasted 50 minutes. Press coverage of the summit was dominated by talk of the Obama-Chávez meeting, the Ortega harangue, and the weakening of U.S. sanctions against Cuba. We are deeply skeptical of any U.S. rapprochement with Venezuela. Chávez is not simply a vulgar loudmouth; he is an authoritarian who has pulverized Venezuelan democracy, brutalized his political opponents, aided narcoterrorists in Colombia, and sought a partnership with Iran. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Chávez regime is guilty of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers.” As for Cuba, Obama himself continues to support the U.S. embargo. So do we. No, it has not toppled the Castro dictatorship, but it is a tool. Cuba will only liberalize when its rulers decide to liberalize. If and when they do, the embargo should be lifted. Until then, we see no reason to reward the Cuban government with a massive unilateral concession. We realize that farm-state politicians are eager for their constituents to gain access to the Cuban market. Their desire to end U.S. sanctions has nothing to do with Cuban freedom. Many of our libertarian friends argue that ditching the embargo would spur a loosening of Cuba’s economic and political controls. We wish it were that easy. Thus far, trading with the rest of the world has not persuaded Havana to hold free elections, release political prisoners, or even adopt Chinese-style economic reforms. What about “flooding” the island with American tourists? European and Canadian tourists have been swarming Cuba’s beaches and hotels for many years now. This has done nothing to ease political repression. Would lifting the embargo improve our image in Latin America? Perhaps, on balance, it would. But that alone is not a compelling reason to lift sanctions. Our Cuba policy should be designed to increase freedom for Cubans, not to curry favor among Latin governments that have neglected their democratic brethren in Castro’s island gulag. In his opening remarks to the summit, Obama proclaimed “a new chapter” of U.S. engagement with the Western Hemisphere — “based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values.” We hope that means Obama will pressure congressional Democrats to ratify the U.S.-Colombia free-trade deal, but we’re not holding our breath. His call for “a new chapter” in hemispheric relations was an implicit dig at the Bush administration. The conventional wisdom is that Bush “ignored” Latin America or was “disengaged” from the region. This charge is unfair. Among other things, the Bush administration played a key role in helping Brazil and Uruguay cope with the aftermath of the 2001 Argentine financial meltdown: It secured a $30 billion IMF package for Brazil and a $1.5 billion U.S. Treasury loan for Uruguay. Bush also signed free-trade pacts with Chile, Central America and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA), Peru, Colombia, and Panama. He broadened “Plan Colombia” and provided valuable assistance to the Uribe administration in its fight against leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. He launched the $1.4 billion Mérida Initiative to combat drug trafficking and crime in Mexico and Central America. And he championed a bold immigration plan that bitterly divided the Republican party and hurt his popularity among conservatives. In short, the idea that Bush ignored Latin America is bunk. There’s no question that the Bush administration shifted its focus after 9/11 — for obvious and understandable reasons — and that Latin America took a back seat to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other challenges. So far, President Obama has likewise spent far more time on the Middle East, Asia, and Europe than he has on the Western Hemisphere. Over the short term, Obama’s priorities in Latin America should be to aid the Mexican government in its bloody war against the drug cartels; to support Central American countries in their own struggles against violent crime (much of it fueled by gangs and drugs); to win congressional approval of the pending free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama; and to enhance U.S. ties with Brazil, the region’s emerging giant. For now, at least, pursuing détente with Venezuela and Cuba would only be a fruitless distraction.

#### There is no correlation between democracy and peace.

**Rosato ’3** – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame (Sebastian, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political Science Review, November 2003, <http://rrii.150m.com/t08/Sebastian%20Rosato%20-%20The%20Flawed%20Logic%20of%20Democratic%20Peace%20Theory.pdf>)//SS

**The causal logics that underpin democratic peace the-** ¶ **ory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace** ¶ **with one another because the mechanisms that make up** ¶ **these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's** ¶ **proponents**. In the case of the normative logic, **liberal** ¶ **democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic** ¶ **norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one an-** ¶ **other with trust and respect when their interests clash.** ¶ Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, **demo-** ¶ **cratic leaders are not especially accountable to peace-** ¶ **loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies** ¶ **are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of sur-** ¶ **prise attack, and open political competition offers no** ¶ **guarantee that a democracy will reveal private informa-** ¶ **tion about its level of resolve.** In view of these findings ¶ there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy ¶ causes peace. ¶ Democratic peace theorists could counter this claim ¶ by pointing out that even in the absence of a good ex- ¶ planation for the democratic peace, the fact remains ¶ that democracies have rarely fought one another. In ¶ addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for ¶ the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique ¶ should also offer a positive account of the finding. ¶ **One potential explanation is that the democratic** ¶ **peace is in fact an imperial peace** based on American ¶ power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the ¶ democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II ¶ phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. Second, the United States has been the dom- ¶ inant power in both these regions since World War II ¶ and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional ¶ peace. ¶ There are three reasons we should expect democratic ¶ peace theory's empirical claims to hold only in the post- ¶ 1945 period. First, as even proponents of the demo- ¶ cratic peace have admitted, there were few democracies¶ in the international system prior to 1945 and even fewer ¶ that were in a position to fight one another. **Since 1945,** ¶ **however, both the number of democracies in the in-** ¶ **ternational system and the number that have had an** ¶ **opportunity to fight one another have grown markedly** ¶ (e.g., Russett 1993,20). Second, while members of dou- ¶ ble democratic dyads were not significantly less likely to ¶ fight one another than members of other types of dyads ¶ prior to World War 11, they have been significantly ¶ more peaceful since then (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997). ¶ Third, **the farther back we go in history the harder it** ¶ **is to find a consensus among both scholars and poli-** ¶ **cymakers on what states qualify as democracies.** De- ¶ pending on whose criteria we use, there may have been ¶ no democratic wars prior to 1945, or there may have ¶ been several (see, e.g., Layne 1994; Ray 1995; Russett ¶ 1993; Spiro 1994). Since then, however, we can be fairly ¶ certain that democracies have hardly fought each other ¶ at all. ¶ Most of the purely democratic dyads since World ¶ War I1 can be found in the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. My analysis includes all pairs of democracies ¶ directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or sep- ¶ arated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and ¶ 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000; Schafer 1993). This yields ¶ 2,427 double democratic dyads, of which 1.306 (54%) ¶ were comprised of two European states, 465 (19%) ¶ were comprised of two American states, and 418 (17%) ¶ comprised one American state and one European state. ¶ In short, 90% of purely democratic dyads have been ¶ confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and ¶ Western Europe. ¶ American preponderance has underpinned, and con- ¶ tinues to underpin stability and peace in both of these ¶ regions. In the Americas the United States has suc- ¶ cessfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of driving ¶ out the European colonial powers and selectively in- ¶ tervening either to ensure that regional conflicts do ¶ not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or ¶ to install regimes that are sympathetic to its interests. ¶ The result has been a region in which most states are ¶ prepared to toe the American line and none have pre- ¶ tensions to alter the status quo. In Europe, the expe- ¶ rience of both World Wars persuaded American poli- ¶ cymakers that U.S. interests lay in preventing the con- ¶ tinent ever returning to the security competition that ¶ had plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars. Major ini- ¶ tiatives including the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic ¶ Treaty, European integration, and the forward deploy- ¶ ment of American troops on German soil should all ¶ be viewed from this perspective. Each was designed ¶ either to protect the European powers from one an- ¶ other or to constrain their ability to act as sovereign ¶ states, thereby preventing a return to multipolarity ¶ and eliminating the security dilemma as a factor in ¶ European politics. These objectives continue to pro- ¶ vide the basis for Washington's European policy today ¶ and explain its continued attachment to NATO and its ¶ support for the eastward expansion of the European ¶ Union. In sum, the United States has been by far the ¶ most dominant state in both the Americas and Western ¶ Europe since World War II and has been committed,¶ above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace. **Evaluating whether the democratic peace finding is** ¶ **caused by democracy or by some other factor such** ¶ **as American preponderance has implications far be-** ¶ **yond the academy**. If peace and security are indeed a ¶ consequence of shared democracy, then international ¶ democratization should continue to lie at the heart of ¶ American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, ¶ **democracy does not cause peace**, then **American poli-** ¶ **cymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy** ¶ **that, while morally praiseworthy, does not make** ¶ **America more secure.**

Warming impacts have no empirical basis- weather will likely get milder

**Bast 12** ( Joseph L. Bast is president and CEO of The Heartland Institute, a 22-year-old national nonprofit research center located in Chicago, Illinois. According to a recent telephone survey, among state elected officials The Heartland Institute is among the nation’s best-known and most highly regarded "think tanks." “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis#Singer)

Alarmists claim global warming will cause massive flooding, more violent weather, famines, and other catastrophic consequences. If these claims are true, then we should have seen evidence of this trend during the twentieth century. Idso and Singer (2009) provide extensive evidence that no such trends have been observed. Even von Storch (2011) admits there is no consensus on these matters**.** The preponderance of scientific data suggest sea levels are unlikely to rise by more than several inches, weather may actually become more mild, and since most warming occurs at night and during the winter season, it has little adverse effect (and some positive effect) on plants and wildlife. Hurricanes are likely to diminish, not increase, in frequency or severity (Spencer, 2008; Singer and Avery, 2008).

**Mars proves—s**olar changes are inevitable and cause more warming

**National Post, 2007** (Lawrence Solomon, staff writer, February 7, “Look to Mars for the Truth on Globl Warming” http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=edae9952-3c3e-47ba-913f-7359a5c7f723&k=0/)

Climate change is a much, much bigger issue than the public, politicians, and even the most alarmed environmentalists realize. Global warming extends to Mars, where the polar ice cap is shrinking, where deep gullies in the landscape are now laid bare, and where the climate is the warmest it has been in decades or centuries. "One explanation could be that Mars is just coming out of an ice age," NASA scientist William Feldman speculated after the agency's Mars Odyssey completed its first Martian year of data collection. "In some low-latitude areas, the ice has already dissipated." With each passing year more and more evidence arises of the dramatic changes occurring on the only planet on the solar system, apart from Earth, to give up its climate secrets. NASA's findings in space come as no surprise to Dr. Habibullo Abdussamatov at Saint Petersburg's Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory. Pulkovo -- at the pinnacle of Russia's space-oriented scientific establishment -- is one of the world's best equipped observatories and has been since its founding in 1839. Heading Pulkovo's space research laboratory is Dr. Abdussamatov, one of the world's chief critics of the theory that man-made carbon dioxide emissions create a greenhouse effect, leading to global warming. "Mars has global warming, but without a greenhouse and without the participation of Martians," he told me. "These parallel global warmings -- observed simultaneously on Mars and on Earth -- can only be a straightline consequence of the effect of the one same factor: a long-time change in solar irradiance." The sun's increased irradiance over the last century, not C02 emissions, is responsible for the global warming we're seeing, says the celebrated scientist, and this solar irradiance also explains the great volume of C02 emissions. "It is no secret that increased solar irradiance warms Earth's oceans, which then triggers the emission of large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. So the common view that man's industrial activity is a deciding factor in global warming has emerged from a misinterpretation of cause and effect relations." Dr. Abdussamatov goes further, debunking the very notion of a greenhouse effect. "Ascribing 'greenhouse' effect properties to the Earth's atmosphere is not scientifically substantiated," he maintains. "Heated greenhouse gases, which become lighter as a result of expansion, ascend to the atmosphere only to give the absorbed heat away."

# 2NC

## CP

### 2nc obama nb – impact

#### Isolates China Taiwan war – that independently goes nuclear

Lowther 3/16 William, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

### 2nc a2: pdcp

#### ‘The’ means all parts

#### Merriam-Websters 8 Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

#### “USFG” is all three branches

**US Legal, No Date** (US Legal Definitions, “United States Federal Government Law & Legal Definition”, http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/) MaxL

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### 2. They don’t get to *assert* the meaning of the plan – should be determined by *contextual lit* – this means Congress is involved

Sullivan 13 (Mark P Sullivan, specialist in Latin American affairs, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress,” report, Congressional Research Service, August 9, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42956.pdf>)

¶ Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and¶ oversight attention to the region during the 112th Congress focused on the increase in drug¶ trafficking-related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative;¶ efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and¶ violent crime; and continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia. The 2010¶ earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti, continued to focus congressional attention on¶ the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S. sanctions on¶ Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a contentious issue in the¶ debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last remaining communist nations.¶ Another area of congressional oversight was the deterioration of democracy in several Latin¶ American countries, especially Nicaragua and Venezuela. Congressional concern also increased¶ about Iran’s growing relations in the region, especially with Venezuela, and about the activities of¶ Hezbollah.¶ Many of these same issues have continued to be the focus of congressional attention in the 113th¶ Congress. Hearings on Latin America have focused on a variety of topics, including an overview¶ of U.S. interests and policy in the Western Hemisphere; energy security issues centering on¶ Mexico and Canada; the posture of the U.S. Northern and Southern Commands; U.S. security¶ cooperation with Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, with Central America under CARSI, and¶ with the Caribbean under CBSI; U.S.-Brazil trade and investment relations; Iranian activities in¶ Latin America and U.S. policy; and human rights in Honduras (see Appendix B).¶ Legislative action to date in the 113th Congress has focused on comprehensive immigration¶ reform (S. 744), Haiti’s recovery and reconstruction (S.Res. 12), reform of the OAS (S. 793), and¶ implementation of a trans-boundary hydrocarbons agreement with Mexico (H.R. 1613). Both¶ houses approved separate versions of an omnibus farm bill (S. 954 and H.R. 2642) with¶ provisions relating to a trade dispute with Brazil over U.S. cotton subsidies; the House version¶ also addresses an ongoing U.S.-Mexico water dispute in the Rio Grande Basin. FY2014 foreign¶ aid appropriations legislation has been reported in each chamber (H.R. 2855 and S. 1372) with¶ numerous provisions on Latin America. FY2014 Treasury Department appropriations legislation¶ has also been reported in each house (H.R. 2786 and S. 1371) with different provisions on U.S.¶ policy on travel to Cuba.¶ Other broad issues of congressional interest in the 113th Congress include challenges to¶ democracy in the region, including media freedom; relations with Mexico, and the status of¶ reforms, under the new administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto; the status of democracy¶ in Venezuela and U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era; prospects for Colombia’s¶ peace negotiations with the FARC and the potential ramifications for U.S. policy and foreign aid;¶ whether and how to strengthen relations with Brazil; progress on negotiations for the Trans-¶ Pacific Partnership (TPP) that includes three Latin American countries (Chile, Mexico, and Peru);¶ and the operation and activities of the OAS.

### 2nc a2: pdb – l to cred

#### Only the counterplan alone solves – acting *independently* is key to Obama’s foreign policy credibility – *economic engagement* decisions are key

Gelb 9 (Leslie H. Gelb, “U.S. Domestic Politics and Power,” in Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy, Harper Collins, 3-17-2009, p.140-141, Google Book)

The United States has the world’s most open political system. It¶ is both blessed and cursed with more accessible paths to its govern-¶ ment officials than any other society. Government secrets spill into¶ the public arena, and virtually everything is discussed publicly, if¶ not intelligently. Other countries romp in our playpen far beyond¶ our capacity to meddle in their societies. They reach into Washing-¶ ton politics in hopes of getting Americans to compromise with each¶ other before negotiating with them. They rejoice when Congress,¶ the White House, and the Defense and State departments square off¶ against one another.¶ Foreign leaders generally understand the iron law of interna-¶ tional bargaining—that real international negotiations take place more within nations than between them. Far too often, presidents seem unaware of this iron law and neglect to protect themselves.¶ In practice, this iron law should benefit American presidents.¶ They have enormous power and authority to do what they want¶ in foreign and national security policy. They can keep the nation¶ at war—as Truman did in Korea, Nixon in Vietnam, and Bush in¶ Iraq—beyond the point of solid public support. They are free to¶ frame U.S. negotiating positions without much interference from¶ any other domestic authority, and most of the time, they do. Bush¶ could and did resist entering serious talks to curb global warming,¶ although a substantial majority of nations and of Americans felt oth-¶ erwise. About the only area in which presidents are challenged effectively is trade negotiations, where the line between foreign and¶ domestic interests is blurred. Presidents lose or give ground at home¶ on foreign and defense affairs only after an extended period of costly¶ failure—only when enveloped in perfect storms.¶ The problem for the president in conducting foreign policy arises¶ from the fact that foreign leaders do not fully understand the magnitude of the president’s prerogatives. They see opportunity, rather than¶ presidential dominance, when they view America’s political turmoil.¶ They forget that even badly wounded presidents can stay their courses,¶ as Truman did on Korea over the wildly popular General Douglas¶ MacArthur and as Bush did on Iraq in the face of his minuscule public¶ approval ratings. Nonetheless, foreign misperceptions often lead foreign leaders to withhold compromises in hopes of flipping American politics against the president. The result is often stalemates in negotia-¶ tions, as happens routinely on trade and security issues.¶ Presidential power slips abroad less because the president actu-¶ ally loses control over policy at home and more because he loses control of foreign perceptions of the domestic policy debate.¶ Presidents need to better manage these misperceptions of their¶ vulnerabilities at home in order to protect their bargaining power¶ overseas. To begin with, they have to remind foreign observers that the raucous mob of actors in American politics is not as influential as it appears.

#### The perm *legitimizes* Congressional intervention – collapses credibility

Brzezinski 10 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, “From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2010, http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/From%20Hope%20to%20Audacity.pdf)

DOMESTIC IMPEDIMENTS¶ What then, on balance, can be said of Obama's foreign policy? So far, it has generated more expectations than¶ strategic breakthroughs. Nonetheless, Obama has significantly altered U.S. policies regarding the three most urgent¶ challenges facing the country. But as a democracy, the United States has to base its foreign policy decisions on¶ domestic political consent. And unfortunately for Obama, gaining that support is becoming more difficult because of¶ three systemic weaknesses that impede the pursuit of an intelligent and decisive foreign policy in an increasingly¶ complex global setting.¶ The first is that foreign policy lobbies have become more influential in U.S. politics. Thanks to their access to¶ Congress, a variety of lobbies -- some financially well endowed, some backed by foreign interests -- have been¶ promoting, to an unprecedented degree, legislative intervention in foreign-policy making. Now more than ever,¶ Congress not only actively opposes foreign policy decisions but even imposes some on the president. (The pending¶ legislation on sanctions against Iran is but one example.) Such congressional intervention, promoted by lobbies, is a¶ serious handicap in shaping a foreign policy meant to be responsive to the ever-changing realities of global politics¶ and makes it more difficult to ensure that U.S. -- not foreign -- interests are the point of departure.¶ The second, documented by a 2009 RAND study, pertains to the deepening ideological cleavage that is reducing the¶ prospects for effective bipartisanship in foreign policy. The resulting polarization not only makes a bipartisan foreign¶ policy less likely, but it also encourages the infusion of demagogy into policy conflicts. And it poisons the public¶ discourse. Still worse, personal vilification and hateful, as well as potentially violent, rhetoric are becoming¶ widespread in that realm of political debate that is subject to neither fact checking nor libel laws: the blogosphere.¶ Last but not least, of the large democratic countries, the United States has one of the least informed publics when it¶ comes to global affairs. Many Americans, as various National Geographic surveys have shown, are not even familiar¶ with basic global geography. Their knowledge of other countries' histories and cultures is not much better. How can a¶ public unfamiliar with geography or foreign history have even an elementary grasp of, say, the geopolitical dilemmas¶ that the United States faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan? With the accelerating decline in the circulation of¶ newspapers and the trivialization of once genuinely informative television reporting, reliable and timely news about¶ critical global issues is becoming less available to the general public. In that context, demagogically formulated¶ solutions tend to become more appealing, especially in critical moments.¶ Together, these three systemic weaknesses are complicating efforts to gain public support for a rational foreign¶ policy attuned to the complexity of the global dilemmas facing the United States. Obama's instinct is to lead by¶ conciliation. That has been his political experience, and it has obviously been the key to his electoral success.¶ Conciliation, backed by personal inspiration and the mass mobilization of populist hopes, is indeed the most¶ important impetus for moving a policy agenda forward in a large democracy. In campaigning for the presidency,¶ Obama proved that he was a master both of social conciliation and of political mobilization. But he has not yet made¶ the transition from inspiring orator to compelling statesman. Advocating that something happen is not the same as¶ making it happen.¶ In the tough realities of world affairs, leadership also requires an unrelenting firmness in overcoming foreign¶ opposition, in winning the support of friends, in negotiating seriously when necessary with hostile states, and in¶ gaining grudging respect even from those governments that the United States sometimes has an interest in¶ intimidating. To these ends, the optimal moment for blending national aspirations with decisive leadership is when the¶ personal authority of the president is at its highest -- usually during the first year in office. For President Obama, alas,¶ that first year has been dominated by the economic crisis and the struggle over health-care reform. The next three¶ years may thus be more difficult. For the United States' national interest, but also for humanity's sake, that makes it¶ truly vital for Obama to pursue with tenacious audacity the soaring hopes he unleashed.

#### Congressional *inaction* is key

Bellia 2 (Patricia, Professor of Law @ Notre Dame, “Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows” Constitutional Commentary, , 19 Const. Commentary 87, Spring, Lexis)

To see the problems in giving dispositive weight to inferences from congressional action (or inaction), we need only examine the similarities between courts' approach to executive power questions and courts' approach to federal-state preemption questions. If a state law conflicts with a specific federal enactment, n287 or if Congress displaces the state law by occupying the field, n288 a court cannot give the state law effect. Similarly, if executive action conflicts with a specific congressional policy (reflected in a statute or, as Youngstown suggests, legislative history), or if Congress passes related measures not authorizing the presidential conduct, courts cannot give the executive action effect. n289 When Congress is silent, however, the state law will stand; when Congress is silent, the executive action will stand. This analysis makes much sense with respect to state governments with reserved powers, but it makes little sense with respect to an Executive Branch lacking such powers. **The combination of** congressional silence and judicial inaction **has the practical effect of** creating power. Courts' reluctance to face questions about the scope of the President's constitutional powers - express and implied - creates three other problems. First, **the implied presidential power given effect by virtue of congressional silence and judicial inaction can** solidify into a broader claim**. When the Executive exercises an "initiating"** or "concurrent" **power, it will tie that power to a textual provision or to a claim about the structure of the Constitution. Congress's silence as a practical matter tends to** validate the executive rationale**, and the Executive Branch may then claim a power not only to exercise the disputed authority in the face of congressional silence, but also to exercise the disputed authority in the face of congressional opposition**. In other words, a power that the Executive Branch claims is "implied" in the Constitution may soon become an "implied" and "plenary" one. Questions about presidential power to terminate treaties provide a  [\*151]  ready example. The Executive's claim that the President has the power to terminate a treaty - the power in controversy in Goldwater v. Carter, where Congress was silent - now takes a stronger form: that congressional efforts to curb the power are themselves unconstitutional. n290

### 2nc agent cps good

#### 3. *Education* – *comparing* agents is key to understand *domestic political structure* for *foreign economic policy*

Milner and Tingley 11 (Helen V. Milner, Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the director of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, president of the International Political Science Association, and Dustin H. Tingley, Paul Sack Associate Professor of Political Economy in the Government Department at Harvard and founding director of the Program on Experience Based Learning in the Social Sciences, “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization Foundation, Winter 2011, p. 38-39)

We bring together two distinct theoretical approaches to examine the sources of¶ American foreign policy¶ :¶ foreign policy analysis and international political econ-¶ omy¶ +¶ Few¶ ,¶ if any¶ ,¶ studies of preferences regarding American trade or aid policy¶ account for the foreign policy concerns of presidents¶ +¶ These studies of both public¶ opinion and legislative voting on trade have concentrated on which type of polit-¶ ical economy model best explains trade preferences¶ +¶ 2¶ Most focus on the domestic¶ political economy sources of trade preferences and do not examine how foreign¶ policy pressures enter the process¶ +¶ For instance¶ ,¶ Hiscox’s important research on¶ congressional voting on trade tests which model of constituency preferences best¶ explains such voting¶ ,¶ but this study did not examine the role of U¶ +¶ S¶ +¶ presidents¶ and how their desire to project power abroad in pursuit of American interests may¶ drive international trade legislation¶ +¶ 3¶ Among the few studies of aid policy prefer-¶ ences that have been conducted¶ ,¶ most have focused on the characteristics of the¶ foreign recipients of aid as an indirect way of identifying the donor’s interests¶ ;¶ they do not examine how politics within donor states actually bring these foreign¶ policy pressures to bear¶ +¶ 4¶ Others consider the aid preferences of domestic groups¶ but ignore the role of the executive branch¶ +¶ 5¶ Understanding the domestic sources¶ of support and opposition to foreign policies is important because it highlights the¶ domestic constraints on leaders as they try to employ these foreign policy tools¶ +¶ In contrast¶ ,¶ studies of American foreign and security policy emphasize the impor-¶ tance of the international context and the foreign policy concerns of the president¶ :¶ Presidents answer to a national constituency and have a constitutional respon-¶ sibility to promote security¶ +¶ This lends itself to a global outlook and the pro-¶ jection of U¶ +¶ S¶ +¶ power and influence abroad¶ +¶ Congress¶ ,¶ on the other hand¶ ,¶ is¶ comprised of electorally independent legislators who are selected by smaller¶ geographic constituencies¶ ;¶ therefore¶ ,¶ legislators tend to have a more paro-¶ chial outlook¶ +¶ 6¶ They have more to gain by protecting domestic earmarks than¶ they do by allocating foreign aid¶ +¶ 7¶ These studies often debate the relative importance of Congress and the president¶ in foreign policy¶ ;¶ an important contribution of this research has been to underline¶ the strong powers of the president in this area¶ +¶ 8¶ Certain studies of foreign eco-¶ nomic policy¶ ,¶ so called “statist” theories¶ ,¶ have also argued for the dominance of¶ the executive branch¶ +¶ 9¶ In particular¶ ,¶ national security concerns often generate sup-¶ port for the president’s position in Congress¶ :¶ “even if members’ personal prefer-¶ ences would lead them to disagree with the president¶ ,¶ their operative preferences¶ are likely to be shaped by public support for the White House during periods of¶ international tension¶ +¶ ”¶ 10¶ This approach suggests that rather than responding to¶ domestic constituency pressures¶ ,¶ legislators respond to the president¶ +¶ It also sug-¶ gests that the president is most powerful when national security concerns can be¶ credibly invoked¶ +¶ 11¶ Many of these foreign policy studies do not explicitly account¶ for the role of political economy factors¶ ,¶ however¶ +¶ Thus foreign policy analysis and¶ international political economy approaches offer two distinct ways to understand¶ preferences surrounding U¶ +¶ S¶ +¶ foreign policy¶.

### --a2: deficit – rollback

#### Statistically *negligible* risk of rollback – prefer *empirical studies*

--collective action problems mean even if some members support rollback, there’s not enough and they can’t organize

--statistical studies prove the risk is less than 0.02% - proves any risk of the NB mathematically outweighs

Krause & Cohen 2K (George and David, Professors of Political Science @ South Carolina, “Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 1, February 2000, JSTOR)

We use the annual number of executive orders issued by presidents from 1939 to 1996 to test our hypotheses. Executive orders possess a number of properties that make them appropriate for our purposes. First, the series of executive orders is long, and we can cover the entirety of the institutionalizing and institutional-ized eras to date.6 Second, unlike research on presidential vetoes (Shields and Huang 1997) and public activities (Hager and Sullivan 1994), which have found support for presidency-centered variables but not president-centered factors, ex-ecutive orders offer a stronger possibility that the latter set of factors will be more prominent in explaining their use. One, they are more highly discretionary than vetoes.7 More critically, presidents take action first and unilaterally. In addition, **Congress has** tended to allow executive orders to stand **due to its own** collective action problems **and the** cumbersomeness of using the legislative process **to reverse or stop such presidential actions.** Moe and Howell (1998) report that between 1973 and 1997, **Congress challenged** only 36 of more than 1,000 executive orders issued**. And** only two of these 36 challenges led to overturning **the president's executive order. Therefore, presidents are likely to be** very successful **in implementing their own agendas through such actions**. In fact, the nature of executive orders leads one to surmise that idiopathic factors will be relatively more important than presidency-centered variables in explaining this form of presidential action. Finally, executive orders have rarely been studied quantitatively (see Gleiber and Shull 1992; Gomez and Shull 1995; Krause and Cohen 1997)8, so a description of the factors motivating their use is worth-while.9 Such a description will allow us to determine the relative efficacy of these competing perspectives on presidential behavior.10

#### Their ev only says it’s theoretically *possible* – ours proves it’s overwhelmingly *improbable*

--informational deficits mean it’s always easier to mobilize support than opposition

--political incentives favor doing nothing – criticism pays better dividends than action

Howell 3 (William G, Assistant Professor of Gov’t @ Harvard, Powers without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action pg. 112)

The real world, obviously, is much more complicated than the unilateral politics model supposes. Uncertainties abound, and presidents frequently set policies without any assurance of congressional acquiescence. It is worth considering then, how presidents fare on those occasions when Congress does respond to a presidential directive. Do presidents tend to win most of the time? Or does Congress consistently crack the legislative whip, effectively enervating imperialistic presidents? Our theoretical expectation are relatively clear. Because the president has access to more (and better) information about goings-on in the executive branch, members of Congress will try to change only a small fraction of all status quo policies in any legislative session, and we should anticipate that members will leave alone the majority of unilateral directives that the president issues. While the president may occasionally overreach on a particularly salient issue, provoking a congressional response, in most instances Congress either will do nothing at all or will endorse the president’s actions.

### --a2 deficit – delay

#### No delay – exos avoid procedurals

Cooper 2 (Phillip J, Professor of Public Administration in the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University, B.A. in Government at California State University, Sacramento, M.A. and Ph.D. the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University, “By Order of the President: Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action,” University of Kansas Press (2002))

Executive orders are often used because they are quick, convenient, and relatively easy mechanisms for moving significant policy initiatives. Though it is certainly true that executive orders are employed for symbolic purposes, enough has been said by now to demonstrate that they are also used for serious policymaking or to lay the basis for important actions to be taken by executive branch agencies under the authority of the orders. Unfortunately, as is true of legislation, it is not always possible to know from the title of orders which are significant and which are not, particularly since presidents will often use an existing order as a base for action and then change it in ways that make it far more significant than its predecessors. The relative ease of the use of an order does not merely arise from the fact that presidents may employ one to avoid the cumbersome and time consuming legislative process. They may also use this device to avoid sometimes equally time consuming administrative procedures, particularly the rulemaking processes require by the Administrative Procedure Act. Because those procedural requirements do not apply to the president, it is tempting for the executive branch agencies to seek assistance from the White House to enact by executive order that which might be difficult for the agency itself to more through the process. Moreover, there is the added plus from the agency’s perspective that it can be considerably more difficult for potential adversaries to obtain standing to launch a legal challenge to the president’s order than it is to move an agency to judicial review. There is nothing new about the practice of generating executive orders outside the White House. President Kennedy’s executive order on that process specifically provides orders generated elsewhere.

#### Deficit flows NEG – substantially faster than the plan

Fleishman 76 (Joel, Prof Law and Policy Sciences, Duke, Law & Contemporary Problems, Summer, p. 38)

Several related factors, in particular, make executive orders especially attractive policymaking tools for a President. First is speed. Even if a President is reasonably confident of securing desired legislation from congress, he must wait for congressional deliberations to run their course. Invariably, he can achieve far faster, if not immediate, results by issuing an executive order. Moreover, when a President acts through an order, he avoids having to subject his policy to public scrutiny and debate. Second is flexibility. Executive orders have the force of law. Yet they differ from congressional legislation in that a President can alter any executive order simply with the stroke of his pen—merely by issuing another executive order. As noted earlier, Presidents have developed the system of classifying national security documents in precisely this manner. Finally, executive orders allow the President, not only to evade hardened congressional opposition, but also to preempt potential or growing opposition—to throw Congress off balance, to reduce its ability to formulate a powerful opposing position.

### 2nc a2: l to ptx

#### Doesn’t burn PC and doesn’t affect ability to push legislative agenda

Grier 1-15-13 (Peter Grier, staff writer, Christian Science Monitor, “Obama and gun control: What actions could he take on his own?” 1-15-2013, http://m.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Wire/2013/0115/Obama-and-gun-control-What-actions-could-he-take-on-his-own)

At his news conference Monday President Obama said he’s considering using his executive powers to order up some new gun-control measures. What sorts of things could he do on the gun issue on his own?¶ Well, he won’t be instituting sweeping edicts such as a ban on assault weapons or high-capacity magazines. Those would require congressional legislation, which he’s also vowed to push for. What Mr. Obama can do is issue executive orders based on his constitutional authority or existing statutes. Generally, this sort of executive action deals with government officials or agencies, according to a 2010 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the subject.¶ Executive orders “usually affect private individuals only indirectly,” according to CRS.¶ Thus one thing Obama might do is tighten the existing background check system meant to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and the mentally ill, according to a list of possible executive actions compiled by the left-leaning Center for American Progress (CAP).¶ Obama could penalize states that don’t provide data on disqualified gun purchasers to the federal government, for instance. He could order federal agencies themselves to do a better job of telling the FBI about individuals that by law may not be qualified to own firearms. He could direct the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to conduct background checks on the employees of federally licensed gun dealers as part of its existing audit program.¶ The president might have the power to require broader reporting of multiple sales of assault rifles to particular individuals, according to CAP. He could also order the FBI to absorb the ATF. “In recent years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has become a beleaguered agency that is unable to adequately fulfill its mission to oversee and enforce federal firearms laws,” claims the CAP.¶ Other actions the president might take include further limits on gun imports, and increased funding for research into the nature and effects of gun violence.¶ The reasons the White House might see the executive action route as attractive are obvious. Congressional action is uncertain, and there is substantial opposition, even among some Democrats, to banning whole weapon classes such as assault rifles. Executive action could allow Obama to trumpet some progress on gun control at a time when the tragic shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Conn., are high in public thought. Yet such action would require little political capital on his part and would not distract from his efforts on something voters still say is their top priority – keeping the economy on track.¶ Meanwhile, Obama’s political adversaries are on watch, lest he overreach. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R) of South Carolina has warned that executive orders in this area might constitute a “power grab.”¶ “The Obama administration better tread lightly on the issue of using Executive Orders to implement gun control measures,” tweeted Senator Graham earlier this month.

## Ag

### 2nc i/l press

#### More evidence – it’s impossible to eliminate agribusiness in the US

**Pfeiffer, 3** – energy editor for From the Wilderness (Dale, “Cuba-A Hope”, From the Wilderness,

<http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103_korea_2.html>.

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States. Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned out by the overproduction of agribusiness.

## Leadership

### 2nc multilat perception alt causes

#### **Single instances of action do not change international perceptions of the U.S.**

Fettweis 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

# 1NR

## Politics

### 2nc impact o/v

#### *Timeframe* is faster than the AFF

Press TV 11-13 (“Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail,” <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/>)

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war. ¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney called on Congress to allow more time for diplomacy as US lawmakers are considering tougher sanctions. ¶ "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," Carney said. "The American people do not want a march to war." ¶ Meanwhile, US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to meet with the Senate Banking Committee on Wednesday to hold off on more sanctions on the Iranian economy. ¶ State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Kerry "will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake." ¶ "While we are still determining if there is a diplomatic path forward, what we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause in sanctions. We are not taking away sanctions. We are not rolling them back," Psaki added.

#### Deterrence solves all other impacts

Gable 11 (William Gable, US Army War College, “An Era of Persistent Conflict?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560155)

Exceptional individuals are key contributors to the turmoil the U.S. experienced in the last decade through the present, and their objectives could portend continued conflict. While the existence of these exceptional individuals alone does not necessarily assure conflict, the ideologies they espouse are underpinned by religion adding a nondeterrable dimension to their struggle. The actual or perceived preponderance of U.S. power will not diminish the likelihood of future attacks. In fact, such attacks will only serve to enhance these organizations‘ status and power, fueling every aspect of their operations from recruiting to financing operations. Consequently, threats from non-state actors will continue. Depending on the potential destruction inflicted by any terrorist attack, the attacker‘s sanctuary, and the threat posed to the aforementioned governments, the U.S. may be compelled to fight wars similar to the war in Afghanistan. Conflict with another state is possible, though less likely. Although the relative decline of U.S. economic power in relation to China appears to constitute a potential ―window‖ or threat to peace, **both** governments are aware of the risks and are working to mitigate them. Moreover, the U.S., China, and Russia represent deterrable nuclear powers**,** states dissuaded from conflict with each other due to the potential costs of a nuclear exchange. Conflict between these states appears unlikely. However, existing theory suggests problems with nondeterrable states that are not responsive to punishment or are willing to take risks that prompt conflict**.** North Korea and Iran seem to fit this description**.** Their efforts to develop, acquire, and possibly proliferate nuclear weapons, combined with the potential threat posed by a non-state actor acquiring such weapons, form conditions that indicate a strong possibility of war. In particular, Iran‘s nuclear program presents a potentially ominous window. Should diplomacy, sanctions, and cyber attacks fail to sidetrack Iran‘s nuclear program, the U.S. will be presented with an ever-narrowing window to act with force to deny Iran this capability. This could result in conflict with Iran. While false optimism is a potent and pervasive cause of war, recent experience with war and the nature of these and likely future conflicts will diminish leaders support for initiating war. Similarly, the current economic conditions and concern over the national debt will dampen leaders‘ enthusiasm for wars. But existing theories that discuss these factors fail to consider the impact of non-state actors. Thus, conflict is still possible despite them. Overall, the combination of factors seems to indicate continuing conflict with nonstate actors and potential conflict with states over development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. These factors identify specific circumstances where U.S. involvement in war is likely, and represent the primary drivers for concluding that the current era will be one of persistent conflict. The U.S. government should use all of the elements of power to focus on these factors to prevent what history and theory suggest the inevitability of war.

#### *Turns* and *solves* cred – Iran swamps their internal

Daremblum 11 (Jaime Daremblum, Hudson Institute senior fellow, “Iran Dangerous Now, Imagine it Nuclear,” Real Clear World, 10-25-2011, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=8439>, kns)

What would it mean if such a regime went nuclear? Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that a nuclear-armed Iran would never use its atomic weapons or give them to terrorists. Even under that optimistic scenario, Tehran's acquisition of nukes would make the world an infinitely more dangerous place. For one thing, it would surely spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Greater Middle East, with the likes of Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - all Sunni-majority Muslim countries - going nuclear to counter the threat posed by Shiite Persian Iran. For another, it would gravely weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. After all, Washington has repeatedly said that the Islamic Republic will not be permitted to get nukes. If Tehran demonstrated that these warnings were utterly hollow, rival governments and rogue regimes would conclude that America is a paper tiger. Once Tehran obtained nuclear weapons, it would have the ultimate trump card, the ultimate protection against outside attack. Feeling secure behind their nuclear shield, the Iranians would almost certainly increase their support for global terrorism and anti-American dictatorships. They would no longer have to fear a U.S. or Israeli military strike. Much like nuclear-armed North Korea today, Iran would be able to flout international law with virtual impunity. If America sought to curb Iranian misbehavior through economic sanctions, Tehran might well respond by flexing its muscles in the Strait of Hormuz. As political scientist Caitlin Talmadge explained in a 2008 analysis, "Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz tops the list of global energy security nightmares. Roughly 90 percent of all Persian Gulf oil leaves the region on tankers that must pass through this narrow waterway opposite the Iranian coast, and land pipelines do not provide sufficient alternative export routes. Extended closure of the strait would remove roughly a quarter of the world's oil from the market, causing a supply shock of the type not seen since the glory days of OPEC." Think about that: The world's leading state sponsor of terrorism has the ability to paralyze destabilize the global economy, and, if not stopped, it may soon have nuclear weapons. As a nuclear-armed Iran steadily expanded its international terror network, the Western Hemisphere would likely witness a significant jump in terrorist activity. Tehran has established a strategic alliance with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, and it has also developed warm relations with Chávez acolytes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua while pursuing new arrangements with Argentina as an additional beachhead in Latin America Three years ago, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Venezuelan government of "employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers." More recently, in July 2011, Peru's former military chief of staff, Gen. Francisco Contreras, told the Jerusalem Post that "Iranian organizations" are aiding and cooperating with other terrorist groups in South America. According to Israeli intelligence, the Islamic Republic has been getting uranium from both Venezuela and Bolivia. Remember: Tehran has engaged in this provocative behavior without nuclear weapons. Imagine how much more aggressive the Iranian dictatorship might be after crossing the nuclear Rubicon. It is an ideologically driven theocracy intent on spreading a radical Islamist revolution across the globe. As the Saudi plot demonstrates, no amount of conciliatory Western diplomacy can change the fundamental nature of a regime that is defined by anti-Western hatred and religious fanaticism.

#### *Turns* and *solves* heg – Iran is more determinative of both substance and perceptions than the plan

Leverett 11-7-13 (Flynt, senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. and a professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs, and Hillary Mann Leverett, EO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA), a political risk consultancy, “America’s moment of truth about Iran,” http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/07/333513/americas-moment-of-truth-about-iran/, CMR)

America’s Iran policy is at a crossroads. Washington can abandon its counterproductive insistence on Middle Eastern hegemony, negotiate a nuclear deal grounded in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and get serious about working with Tehran to broker a settlement to the Syrian conflict. In the process, the United States would greatly improve its ability to shape important outcomes there. Alternatively, America can continue on its present path, leading ultimately to strategic irrelevance in one of the world’s most vital regions-with negative implications for its standing in Asia as well. U.S. policy is at this juncture because the costs of Washington’s post-Cold War drive to dominate the Middle East have risen perilously high. President Obama’s self-inflicted debacle over his plan to attack Syria after chemical weapons were used there in August showed that America can no longer credibly threaten the effective use of force to impose its preferences in the region. While Obama still insists “all options are on the table” for Iran, the reality is that, if Washington is to deal efficaciously with the nuclear issue, it will be through diplomacy. In this context, last month’s Geneva meeting between Iran and the P5+1 brought America’s political class to a strategic and political moment of truth. Can American elites turn away from a self-damaging quest for Middle Eastern hegemony by coming to terms with an independent regional power? Or are they so enthralled with an increasingly surreal notion of America as hegemon that, to preserve U.S. “leadership,” they will pursue a course further eviscerating its strategic position? The proposal for resolving the nuclear issue that Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, presented in Geneva seeks answers to these questions. It operationalizes the approach advocated by Hassan Rouhani and other Iranian leaders for over a decade: greater transparency on Iran’s nuclear activities in return for recognizing its rights as a sovereign NPT signatory-especially to enrich uranium under international safeguards-and removal of sanctions. For years, the Bush and Obama administrations rejected this approach. Now Obama must at least consider it.

#### *Turns* and *solves* relations – Iran is more determinative of perceptions than the plan

Leverett 12 (professor at Pennsylvania State University's School of International Affairs, “America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order,” 7-5-2012, <http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=3490>)

Second, secondary sanctions are a political house of cards. American officials are well aware of their presumptive illegality. Successive U.S. administrations have been reluctant to impose them on non-U.S. entities transacting with Iran, precisely to avoid formal challenges at the WTO. U.S. secondary sanctions are, in effect, an enormous bluff, leveraging the specter of legal and reputational risk in America to bully companies and banks in third countries to stop transacting with Iran, but without pulling the trigger on the threat to punish those that continue doing business in Iran. The UK and European sanctions now facing legal challenges are a product of this bullying campaign. For over a decade, the EU has condemned America’s threatened ‘extraterritorial’ application of national trade law, warning it would go to the WTO if Washington ever sanctioned European companies over Iran-related business. Over the last several years, though, enough British and European businesses stopped transacting with Iran that the EU was no longer under pressure to defend European commercial interests and could begin subordinating its Iran policy to American preferences. By last year, it has imposed a nearly comprehensive economic embargo against the Islamic Republic. While Europe has surrendered on having an independent Iran policy, the U.S. bluff on secondary sanctions will soon be called, most likely by China. To be sure, Beijing does not seek confrontation with America over Iran, and has sought to accommodate Washington in many ways—e.g., by not developing trade and investment positions in the Islamic Republic as rapidly as it might have, and by shifting some Iran-related transactional flows into renminbi to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks. While China’s imports of Iranian oil appear, in the aggregate, to be growing, Beijing reduces them when the administration is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. The Obama administration, for its part, continues giving China sanctions waivers; the one Chinese bank barred from America for Iran-related transactions is a Chinese energy company subsidiary with no U.S. business. But as Congress legislates more secondary sanctions, Obama’s room to maneuver is shrinking. Obama will soon be in the position of demanding that China cut Iranian oil imports in ways that would harm its economy, and that Chinese banks stop virtually all Iran-related transactions. Beijing will not be able to accommodate such radical demands; it will have to say ‘no’, putting Obama in a classic lose-lose situation. “If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Hassan Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT.” Obama could retreat. But then the world will know that secondary sanctions are a bluff, undercutting their deterrent effect. Alternatively, he could sanction major Chinese firms and banks. But that will force Beijing to respond—at least by taking America to the WTO (where China will win), perhaps by retaliating against U.S. companies. At this point, Beijing has more ways to impose costs on America for violations of international economic law impinging on Chinese interests than Washington has levers to coerce Chinese compliance with U.S. policy preferences. America and its partners will not come out ahead in this scenario. Third, U.S. secondary sanctions accelerate the shift of economic power from West to East. As non-Western economies surpass more Western countries in their relative importance to the global economy, America has a strong interest in keeping non-Western states tied to established, U.S.-dominated mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international transactions. Secondary sanctions, though, push in the opposite direction, incentivizing emerging powers to speed up development of non-Western alternatives to existing transactional platforms. “Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs.” This trend will diminish Western influence in myriad ways—e.g., reducing the dollar’s role as a transactional currency, lowering the share of cross-border commodity trades on New York and London exchanges, and shrinking the global near-monopoly of Western-based reinsurance companies and P&I clubs. Add the cost of a U.S.-instigated trade dust-up with China, and the self-damaging quality of America’s dysfunctional Iran policy becomes even clearer. Finding a New Approach Putting America on a better strategic trajectory will take thoroughgoing revision of its Iran policy. In this regard, the election of Hassan Rohani—who ran the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council for sixteen years, was its chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, and holds advanced degrees in Islamic law and civil law—as Iran’s next president is an opportunity. If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT—first of all, by acknowledging Iran’s right to safeguarded enrichment. Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs. This, however, is even more difficult than revising the U.S. position on Iranian enrichment—for Congress has legislated conditions for lifting sanctions that stipulate Iran’s abandonment of all alleged WMD activities, cutting all ties to those Washington deems terrorists, and political transformation. Overcoming this will require Obama to do what President Nixon did to enable America’s historic breakthrough with China—going to Tehran, strategically if not physically, to accept a previously demonised political order as a legitimate entity representing legitimate national interests. None of this is particularly likely. But if America doesn’t do these things, it condemns itself to a future as an increasingly failing, and flailing, superpower—and as an obstacle, rather than a facilitator, of rules-based international order.

### --a2 sanctions inev

#### This strategy is *working* now

Lobe 11-17-13 (Jim, New York-based journalist on U.S. foreign policy with a focus on the Middle East and Central Asia, Master's degree in Philosophy and Public Policy from the London School of Economics and Political Science, “Obama Gets More Time for Iran Nuclear Deal,” <http://original.antiwar.com/lobe/2013/11/16/obama-gets-more-time-for-iran-nuclear-deal/>, CMR)

The administration of President Barack Obama appears to have succeeded in preventing Congress from enacting new sanctions against Iran before the next round of nuclear-related talks between the U.S. and other great powers and Tehran scheduled for Geneva Nov. 20. As a result, optimism that at least an interim deal may soon be achieved between Iran and the so-called P5+1 (US, Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) appears once again on the rise here, amidst rumors circulating late Friday that Secretary of State John Kerry himself may lead the US delegation. While some senators may still try to attach sanctions amendments to pending legislation – notably the 2014 defense authorization bill (NDAA) to be taken up next week – most observers **on Capitol Hill believe they will be highly unlikely to be voted on before Congress’s** two-week **Thanksgiving recess**, **pushing** any possible **new** legislative **action** against Iran **into December**. The administration had been concerned that new sanctions would strengthen hard-liners in Tehran, **who would use it as evidence** that **Obama** **was** either **unable or unwilling to strike a deal that would not cross Iran’s “red line”** – a refusal to recognize the Islamic Republic’s “right” to enrich uranium within certain limits under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). **Any strengthening of the hard-liners**, it was feared, **would force** President Hassan **Rouhani and** his foreign minister, Mohammed Javad **Zarif, to toughen their terms for a deal, making an agreement with the P5+1 much more difficult to achieve**. Defying pressure from the powerful Israel lobby, **several key senators this week indicated they backed delaying action on** new or pending **sanctions** legislation **and giving the administration a chance to conclude** at least **an interim deal that could** pave the way **to a comprehensive accord** on Iran’s nuclear program within six months to a year. “**I strongly oppose any attempt to increase sanctions** against Iran while P5+1 negotiations are ongoing,” **said** Dianne **Feinstein, the influential chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee**, in a statement issued Friday. “**The purpose of sanctions was to bring Iran to the negotiating table, and** they have succeeded in doing so**.** Tacking new sanctions onto the defense authorization bill or any other legislation would not lead to a better deal,” she said, **echoing several other colleagues**, **including the chair**man of **the Senate Armed Services Committee,** Carl Levin. “It would lead to no deal at all.”

#### Senate leadership will *defer to PC* – Obama’s sustained involvement key to check pressure

Dreyfus 11-13 (Bob Dreyfus, The Nation, “Did the Israel Lobby Agree to Hold Off on New Iran Sanctions?” 11-13-2013, <http://www.thenation.com/blog/177144/did-israel-lobby-agree-hold-new-iran-sanctions>)

Today the leaders of the US negotiating team are on Capitol Hill, trying to dissuade senators from that sort of outright sabotage. Secretary of State John Kerry, along with Wendy Sherman, are meeting with members of the Senate Banking Committee and others to beg, plead and cajole the Capitol Hill busybodies, many of whom are strongly influenced by the Israel lobby and its chief arm, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. So far, it appears that the Democratic-controlled Senate, despite its AIPAC ties, is willing to go along with White House requests to avoid interfering in the talks. Reports The Wall Street Journal:¶ Proponents of tougher sanctions could seek avenues beside the Banking Committee to move a measure.… Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) is likely to oppose such a move, however. Mr. Reid on Tuesday warned against attempts to force “extraneous issues” into the debate over the defense bill.¶ Obama administration officials have been reaching out to a number of lawmakers in recent days to tamp down any momentum for new sanctions. Mr. Kerry has personally spoken with key senators while traveling in recent days, and was to speak to top Senate Democrats on Wednesday.¶ As for AIPAC itself, it issued a statement saying that it won’t accept any delays in sending a wrecking ball aimed at the talks. “AIPAC continues to support congressional action to adopt legislation to further strengthen sanctions, and there will absolutely be no pause, delay or moratorium in our efforts.”¶ The comment on “pause, delay or moratorium” follows an effort by the White House, which recently met with American Jewish organizations, to seek exactly that: a moratorium on new anti-Iran sanctions while the talks are underway. As the AP reported on October 29:¶ The White House has updated Jewish and pro-Israel groups about its talks with Iran amid concerns by some of the groups about the U.S. easing sanctions pressure on Iran over its nuclear program.¶ The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the powerful pro-Israel lobbying group, attended the meeting along with the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.¶ The White House’s National Security Council says senior officials told Jewish leaders that the U.S. will not let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon but wants to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy.¶ The Obama administration is asking Congress to hold off on new sanctions while it pursues diplomacy. But Israel and AIPAC are pressing the administration to retain harsh economic sanctions.¶ That’s tricky for AIPAC, and for Israel. Because if they defy the White House and push aggressively for new sanctions and fail, it will be a major, even unprecedented defeat for AIPAC—plus, it makes outright enemies of the Obama administration and the president himself. Scuttlebutt after the White House meeting suggested that the Jewish groups (AIPAC, the ADL and the AJC) had quietly agreed to allow the negotiations to unfold without the added interference of new sanctions.¶ Laura Rozen, reporting for Al-Monitor, penned a detailed report on the talks between the White House and the Jewish groups, at which Sherman was joined by Susan Rice, Obama’s national security adviser, and two top White House aides, Antony Blinken and Ben Rhodes.¶ Following the talks, there was conflicting information about whether or not the Jewish groups (which, collectively, make up the bosses of the Israel lobby) had agreed to a “pause” in their lobbying efforts. According to Haaretz, the liberal Israeli daily, the four groups did indeed agree to a moratorium:¶ Though they refrained from describing it as “a deal” or a quid pro quo, sources familiar with the meeting said they had agreed to a limited “grace period” only after hearing assurances from the Administration that it had no intention of easing sanctions or of releasing Iranian funds that have been “frozen” in banks around the world.¶ That was later denied by the same groups, according to The Jerusalem Post:¶ A report published in Haaretz on Friday claiming that US Jewish leaders have agreed to halt their lobbying efforts in support of a new sanctions bill against Iran has been roundly denied by their organizations.¶ “No one has given any commitment to make some public moratorium,” said sources with an organization represented at the meeting, “categorically denying” that any such commitment was given.¶ However, in an on-the-record interview with Haaretz, the ADL’s Abraham Foxman (who attended the White House gathering on October 29) confirmed the cease-fire:¶ ADL National Director Abe Foxman has confirmed that leaders of major Jewish organizations have agreed on a limited “time out” during which they will not push for stronger sanctions on Iran.¶ “That means that we are not lobbying for additional sanctions and we are not lobbying for less sanctions,” Foxman told Haaretz, as well as US media outlets.¶ Foxman was responding to a report in Haaretz on Friday that cited understandings reached among the leaders of four major Jewish organizations who participated in a Monday meeting at the White House with a group of senior White House officials led by National Security Adviser Susan Rice.¶ Foxman was specific, too:¶ Foxman made clear, however, that the hiatus is only tactical in nature. “We still believe that sanctions have worked and that additional sanctions would also work,” Foxman said, “but the Administration feels otherwise. They believe that further sanctions at this time would harm prospects for a diplomatic solution.”¶ “We didn’t change our positions and they didn’t change their positions. But we’re not going to be out there before the end of the next two meetings of the P5+1 with Iran.”¶ The risk for the Israel lobby is enormous. If it tries to wreck the talks and fails, because members of Congress—especially Democrats in the Senate—sanely agree to postpone a new round of sanctions, it will look powerless and ineffective. So it has to tread carefully, all while being pushed, hard, by Netanyahu and Co. in Israel.¶ According to Politico, Senate Democrats are willing to give the White House room to negotiate:¶ Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-S.D.) said his panel will not draft new economic penalties toward Iran until the Senate has fully digested that briefing. Even then, Johnson said he will defer to his leadership and the White House to give him the green light. …¶ Two members of Democratic leadership, Sens. Patty Murray of Washington and Chuck Schumer of New York, both said they remain undecided on pursuing new sanctions and will continue to talk to top administration brass.

### --a2 kerry does iran

#### Maximizing time and focus on Iran is vital – NOT ONLY IN CONGRESS BUT ABROAD – plan trades off with BOTH

Pillar 10-18 (Paul Pillar, Georgetown security studies professor, “Sabotaging Iran Nuclear Talks,” 10-18-2013, <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Sabotaging-Iran-Nuclear-Ta-by-Consortium-News-Iran_Iran-Versus-Israel_Nuclear-Powers_Obama-131018-347.html>, ldg)

But if you are interested in avoiding an Iranian nuclear weapon -- the focus of negotiations this week in Geneva -- at least the way the crisis of governance in Washington ended provides a silver lining to this sorry chapter in American political history. This is because if President Obama is going to reach an agreement to keep the Iranian nuclear program peaceful and to make that agreement stick, he needs to demonstrate the ability and willingness to rein in destructive behavior in Congress that would preclude such an agreement. But it would not be sufficient, and would not be a fair trade, for the concessions and restrictions we want from Iran in a comprehensive and lasting agreement. Nor would it be sufficient for the President, as has been suggested, merely to be lax in the enforcement of legislatively impose sanctions. Besides showing disrespect for the law, this would hardly reassure the Iranians that an agreement would stick. They would understandably fear that what one U.S. president might decline to enforce the next one would. The administration will need congressional cooperation to undo sanctions that were erected supposedly to induce the Iranians to accept just such an agreement. The President can accomplish some rollback of sanctions on his own authority, and that might be sufficient for some sort of partial, interim, confidence-building deal. Even before getting to the point of striking a deal, congressional action can scuttle the prospects for one or at least make it far harder to reach an agreement. The imposition of still more sanctions, and the rattling of more sabers through legislation that refers to military force, are the sorts of congressional actions that would be a slap in the face of a new Iranian administration that has just placed a constructive proposal on the negotiating table, would feed already understandable Iranian suspicions that the United States is interested only in regime change and not in an agreement, and thereby would weaken the Iranian incentive to make still more concessions. Unfortunately legislation for more sanctions and more saber-rattling has already been introduced in Congress. Pushing back against the promoters of such legislation involves some of the same perpetrators who had to be pushed back to avoid default and to end the shutdown. All of the co-sponsors of a bill from Rep. Trent Franks, R-Arizona, that is a thinly disguised authorization for launching a war against Iran were among those who this week voted against the resolution that ended the funding and debt crisis. Mr. Obama's demonstration of backbone this month will help on the Iran issue, but there still are other reasons to question whether the administration will similarly show sufficient fortitude on behalf of an agreement to keep the Iranian nuclear program peaceful. For one thing, the President does not have the unanimous support of his own party, as he did in the standoff that just ended. A significant number of Democrats, not just Republicans, have come under the sway of those determined to prevent an agreement. Also, even those who consider the Iranian issue important have to admit that avoidance of default (and keeping the U.S. government running) is about as serious a matter as the President is likely to face, and he cannot be expected to give as much priority to every issue as he did to that one. Besides political capital, it also takes time and attention to tend directly to a foreign policy initiative, and to keep beating back unhelpful behavior in Congress that threatens to undermine the initiative. The attempt of congressional miscreants to play chicken has taken a toll here, too. The President skipped a couple of East Asian summit meetings to deal with that problem in Washington. Secretary of State Kerry subbed for him, which meant Kerry had that much less time and attention to devote to other matters that are his responsibility, such as the Israeli-Palestinian talks (remember those?) and the Iranian nuclear negotiations. That senior policymakers have only so much energy and so many hours in a day is an understandable drag on many things we expect them to do. But Obama and Kerry have to muster the time and attention for what is happening on these other issues and particularly Iran, not only at negotiating tables in the Middle East or Geneva but also on Capitol Hill.

#### Obama is the Velcro president – Kerry action links

Nicholas and Hook 10. (Peter and Janet, Staff Writers – LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3>)

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit. Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end. So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times. "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) said: "The man came in promising change. He has a higher profile than some presidents because of his youth, his race and the way he came to the White House with the message he brought in. It's naive to believe he can step back and have some Cabinet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office."

### --a2 no impact to sanctions

#### U.S. AND Israeli strikes are independently likely – but even absent strikes, sanctions trigger escalating instability, prolif, and collapse the global economy

Cordesman 13 (Anthony Cordesman, CSIS, “Negotiating with Iran: The Strategic Case for Pragmatism and Real Progress”, 9-23-2013, <http://csis.org/publication/negotiating-iran-strategic-case-pragmatism-and-real-progress>)

Nevertheless, it makes no sense at all to reject Hassan Rouhani’s opening or condemn the Obama Administration’s response. Iran’s nuclear programs have moved to the point where it is extremely doubtful that there will be another chance to begin what may be a long and difficult process for all nations involved, and an attempt at resolution is far better than any of the real world alternatives. As long as any negotiations that follow are realistic in terms of their content, and do not endorse indefinite delay in a U.S. response while Iran’s nuclear programs move forward, they offer what will be the last real hope of avoiding preventive strikes or a process of containment that would lock the region into an Iranian-Israeli nuclear arms race, a probable Saudi effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons, and a U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. The Uncertain Outcome of Preventive Strikes The United States, Iran, and all the other nations involved need to be far more pragmatic about what will happen if time does run out and Iran does go nuclear. Iran may well face a series of preventive strikes – triggered by Israel or planned by the United States – that will destroy far more than its nuclear facilities. This may or may not actually halt the Iranian nuclear effort. A limited set of Israeli preventive strikes could either force the United States to follow up, or create a situation in which Iran rejects all arms control and UN inspection and carries out a massive new disperse nuclear program or a crash basis. It could also drive Iran to lash out into a new wave of confrontation with the United States and Iran’s neighbors. A U.S.-led set of preventive strikes would be more successful, but the United States could only be sure of suppressing a meaningful Iran nuclear effort if it quickly re-strikes any known target it fails to destroy the first time, carries out constant surveillance of Iran, and repeatedly and thoroughly strikes at the targets created by any new Iranian initiatives. The United States would need regional support to do this and probably prolonged regional agreement to U.S. basing. At a minimum, the result would be years more of a regional arms race, military tension, and Iranian efforts to find ways to attack or pressure the Arab states, Israel, and United States. As the current conflict in Syria makes all too clear, no one can predict how much support the United States will really get from any of its allies, its own U.S. Congress, and no one can predict the limits to Iran’s reactions, ability to use third parties, and willingness to confront the United States and the region with new nuclear, missile, and asymmetric threats. The United States would face an almost certain challenge in the UN from Russia and China, and there is no way any U.S. action against Iran could be separated from Iran’s efforts in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon; Afghanistan, or any other issue where Iran could try to find some form of revenge. This is not an argument for not acting. The risk of a fully nuclear Iran is simply too great. It is a very strong argument for finding a good alternative if one can be negotiated on realistic terms. The Uncertain Outcome of Iran Nuclear Weapons and Containment: The Most Likely Outcome is a No Win Escalation Ladder Contest If there are no preventive strikes – or preventive strikes fail to halt Iran – what is now a largely quiet one-sided nuclear arms race would become far more threatening. At one level, this arms race would become one between Iran and any allies it could find and the United States and its Arab allies in or near the Gulf. A nuclear Iran could change the balance in terms of the credibility of U.S. and Arab willingness to engage against Iranian threats, intimidation, and use of its asymmetric forces. It would inevitably make Gulf petroleum exports the scene of an ongoing arms race and constant tension, and risk a clash that might escalate in untended ways. What is less apparent – and needs far more realistic attention in Iran and outside assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat – is the impact of Iran actually going nuclear. One or several crude nuclear devices do not create a nuclear force. Iran cannot produce enough capable nuclear forces for at least the next decade to pose more of an existential threat to Israel than Israel can pose to Iran. Israel would scarcely be passive, however, and Israel already has far more capable missiles than Iran. Israel also has thermonuclear weapons, rather than the early fission devices Iran will probably be limited to for at least the next half-decade. As a result Israel will pose more of an existentialist threat to an Iran as dependent on the survival of Tehran than Iran can pose to an Israel dependent on the survival of Tel Aviv. As the United States and former Soviet Union both learned during the Cold War, even Iranian parity or superiority would be meaningless. The problem with mutually assured destruction is that no state can ever win an existential strike contest. As for the rest of the Middle East, if Iran shows it is going nuclear to enhance its power and dominate the Gulf region – as may be Iran’s real motive – the resulting threat to world oil exports and the world economy is not likely to intimidate to any degree that will benefit Iran. It will push both the United States and Arab states into responding. The fact Iran succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons might increase the level of deterrence of a direct invasion, but would not lead the United States, or surrounding Arab states to passively accept the result. The United States already is transferring more than ten times the value of Iran’s total arms imports to its Gulf allies. Its ties to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman already give the United States and its Gulf allies the ability to devastatingly defeat Iran in any direct military confrontation. Iran can only vastly increase the scale of the resulting destruction that the United States and its allies inflict if Iran ever actually escalates to the use of nuclear weapons. But the United States, the Arab allies, Israel, and other regional states will suffer as well – along with the global economy – if the end result is a major interruption in the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.

### --a2 no deal

#### Yes deal – momentum, new compromise, and enrichment settlement

Soloman and Norman 11-22-13 (Jay and Laurence, WSJ writers, “Negotiators Near Iran Nuclear Deal, Again: Compromise Seen on Tehran's Right to Enrich; Kerry, Other Foreign Ministers Fly to Geneva Talks to Try to Conclude Pact, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579213820365664920>)

GENEVA—Iran and world powers neared a crucial compromise Friday on a late roadblock to a deal to curb Tehran's nuclear program, according to Western and Iranian diplomats taking part in the negotiations. A compromise on that issue—Iran's demand that it be explicitly allowed to keep some domestic uranium enrichment capacity—could lend momentum to the push for an agreement and at least a temporary reprieve from a decade long standoff over Tehran's program and elevated fears of war over it, according to these officials. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with E.U. representatives in Geneva on Friday in an attempt to hash out details of a possible deal to curb Iran's nuclear program. Via The Foreign Bureau, WSJ's global news update. In an effort to complete an agreement, the White House sent Secretary of State [John Kerry](http://topics.wsj.com/person/K/John-Kerry/7196) to Geneva late Friday to join the negotiations with Iran and the other members of the international group. The foreign ministers of France, Russia and the U.K. also confirmed they were headed to Geneva to take part. Mr. Kerry traveled to the Swiss lakeside city two weeks ago, with hopes of a deal high then, but failed that time to come home with an agreement. "Secretary Kerry will travel…with the goal of continuing to help narrow the differences and move closer to an agreement," State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki said. The remaining issues also included the West's demand that Iran cease its construction of a heavy-water reactor in the city of Arak, which will be capable of producing weapons-usable plutonium, according to the Western and Iranian diplomats. Washington and its partners also are seeking to significantly scale back Iran's industrial program to enrich uranium, a second track used to produce the fissile material needed to make nuclear weapons. Iran denies it is seeking an atomic bomb. U.S. and European officials stressed Friday that gaps still remained that could stall the negotiations and rekindle fears of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. But these officials said they have continued to narrow the differences on these key points. Attending the talks with Iran are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China—and Germany, a bloc known as the P5+1. Iran asserts an inalienable right under the U.N.'s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. The Barack Obama and George W. Bush administrations both rejected Iran's position and the U.S. joined with the U.N. Security Council to demand Tehran suspend any production of nuclear fuel, due to fears it could be diverted for military purposes. Tehran's position on enrichment has emerged in recent weeks as one of the fundamental stumbling blocks to a deal being completed, according to U.S. and Iranian officials. The country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, described enrichment as a "red line" for the government in a nationally televised speech Wednesday. In three days of talks in Geneva, Iran and the P5+1 ministers have neared an agreement on language that could address the enrichment issue, according to diplomats involved in the talks. The language of the agreement likely will state that the global powers will accept that Iran should enjoy all of the rights of nonproliferation treaty signatory states, provided it addresses international concerns about the alleged military dimensions of Tehran's nuclear program. But the U.S. and the other P5+1 states wouldn't explicitly recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium. The language is seen as vague enough that both sides can argue that they have stuck to their negotiating positions. "This is really something people were really starting to get a handle on," said a Western diplomat familiar with the talks. "We have moved forward on this point quite a bit." U.S. officials declined to comment on the emerging agreement on the enrichment issue. Any final agreement that doesn't explicitly require that Iran completely dismantles its nuclear-fuel production is likely to face strong opposition from the U.S. Congress and close American allies, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent weeks repeatedly has described the emerging deal in Geneva as a "bad one" because Iran would maintain the infrastructure to produce fissile materials used in building atomic weapons. He has been joined by many lawmakers on Capitol Hill who have been pressuring the White House to get more concessions from Tehran. U.S. officials have said that is impractical. "Letting Iran enrich is an intolerable risk Congress and allies from Saudi Arabia and Israel have uniformly rejected," said Josh Block of the Israel Project, a U.S. organization that promotes U.S.-Israel relations. "It will have allies across the region asking if they trust the White House when it says Iran won't be able to build nuclear weapons." The Obama administration views an initial deal with Iran as a "first step" toward a broader pact to permanently remove the Iranian nuclear threat. This interim agreement will comprise a six-month confidence-building phase during which time Tehran will roll back the most dangerous parts of its atomic work, including the production of near weapons-grade fuel, in return for an easing of Western sanctions, according to U.S. officials. Iran and the P5+1 have held three rounds of negotiations since the August inauguration of President Hasan Rouhani, who has pledged to improve Tehran's relationship with the U.S. and the West.

#### Prior disagreement is our brink, not their non-unique – sustained application of PC makes a deal likely

Maloney 11-13 (Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Middle East Voices, “INSIGHT: US, Iran Find Nuclear Breakthrough Hard to Achieve,” 11-13-2013, <http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2013/11/insight-us-iran-find-nuclear-breakthrough-hard-to-achieve-26834/>)

The failure should be kept in perspective. After all, the latest Geneva round still represents the most serious, sustained dialogue between leading American and Iranian officials since the revolution. And while surely the six foreign ministers who rushed to Geneva would have preferred a photo-op finish complete with a signing ceremony, the engagement of all these principals in the diplomatic grunt work of trying to hammer out mutually acceptable terms should have a salutary impact on their state's investment in an eventual outcome. Despite the doom-sayers, diplomacy will go on. The incentives that all parties see for achieving a negotiated agreement remain just as powerful as ever, and the disincentives surrounding any possible alternative course continue to loom large even for skeptics of the process. The time-out may be just what the embryonic process needs — a chance to buy time and space to work through the continuing contentious issues. The controversy among some of America’s allies over the terms proposed in the talks will help sell the deal within Iran, to the extent that it needs selling. And a protracted germination is a far more viable path to a sustainable solution than an agreement that is rushed to conclusion amidst a fragmenting political coalition.